I know there are many people out there who find themselves lying awake at night wondering; how exactly did the Gold Coast become Ghana to what extent did British policy reflect the concerns of Communism, chieftancy and the Commonwealth? You may have also found yourself wondering what was the nature of the relationship between Nkrumah and Gold Coast Governor Sir Charles Arden Clarke? I was once like you until I wrote this shoddy essay, and now you can be like me and answer those questions that you have turned over and over again in your mind.
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| Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. |
In this essay the British approaches to the various issues that arose in
the Gold Coast in the lead up to it becoming Ghana in 1957 will be discussed.
This discussion will be focussed on the efforts, achievements and compromises
of the two men that dominated political life in the Gold Coast before
independence; Kwame Nkrumah, the head of the Convention People’s Party and
first Prime Minister of Ghana, and Sir Charles Arden Clarke, the last Governor
General of the Gold Coast. The examination of the roles these men played in the
local and international issues that arose on the road towards the independence
of the Gold Coast will be chiefly informed by the primary sources that are
available in the British Documents on the End of Empire series. The two
volumes of this series on Ghana were edited by Richard Rathbone who has written
extensively on Gold Coast politics, which will provide a valuable secondary
literature on the issues that arose before independence. In discussing this
topic it is necessary to first establish where the importance of Gold Coast lay
for the British and what role they had in mind for Ghana in the development of
global politics after the Second World War.
British concerns with
regard to the importance of Gold Coast were reflected by much of the West at
this time, the concern lay chiefly with maintaining friendly relationships with
smaller nations to ensure that they remained outside of Soviet ‘spheres of
influence’. Sir Richard Acland (Liberal MP; Labour MP from 1945; one of the
principle founders of the Common Wealth Party) elucidated on these fears and
aims in relation to the Gold Coast stating that “We believe that in one form or
another the dominant world fact for at least the next quarter of a century is
bound to be the contest between Freedom and Totalitarianism, between Democrats
and Communists” adding that “Against this background the importance of the Gold
Coast almost states itself without argument”.
Given
the fact that the Gold Coast was the country most likely to be the first of the
African nations to attain independence British attitudes towards it lay not in
concerns of its strategic or economic importance. The importance the British
attached to the Gold Coast was reflective of the weight attached at this time to
the ‘Domino Theory’, which intimated that any country lost to Communism would
adversely impact neighbouring nations and push them towards Communism as well.
As the Gold Coast was going to lay the foundation for West Africa, and possibly
other areas of Africa, as the first nation to attain independence its
importance was in the direction it took after independence. Sir Charles Arden
Clarke affirmed this point of view after the Gold Coast had become independent
stating that “Ghana is a small country, with a population under five million
and of no particular strategic importance; it is under-developed and its
economy is mainly dependent on one crop-cocoa. Nevertheless it is very
important just now because it is the spearhead of emergent Africa, politically
and constitutionally”.
It
was in this context that the importance of the Gold Coast lay and was for this
reason that the British were eager that Ghana should remain within the
Commonwealth. As noted by Mr. A. Mackintosh (Private Secretary to Jim
Griffiths’ Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Attlee Government from
February 1950), “It must be our aim on the one hand to keep on good terms with
Gold Coast political leaders so that when the time comes the Gold Coast will
elect voluntarily to remain within the Commonwealth”
.
Political life on the African side in the Gold Coast was dominated by one party
the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and in many ways one man; the leader of the
CPP Kwame Nkrumah. However, the British relationship with Nkrumah was not
always a friendly one. As the era of movement towards independence progressed
there was a fundamental shift in the way the British dealt with Nkrumah and
indeed how Nkrumah operated politically also. It is to this relationship that
we will now turn, examining the British concerns about Nkrumah and the eventual
partnership that emerged between Britain and the CPP.
In June of 1949 Kwame
Nkrumah broke from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) of J.B. Danquah and
founded the CPP. Nkrumah viewed the UGCC as being merely representative of the
merchant and lawyer class of the country and setup the CPP as he “realised that
this movement was doomed to failure because it ignored the interests of the
masses”.
The CPP overshadowed Danquah’s UGCC as the voice of Gold Coast nationalism
throughout the 1950s running on the platform of ‘self-government now’ replacing
the UGCC slogan of ‘self-government in the shortest possible time’.
The strategy employed by the CPP and advocated by Nkrumah was the main source
of political animosity between him and the British administration; that was
‘positive action’. The “weapons of Positive Action” as explained by Nkrumah
were “1- Legitimate political action, 2- Newspapers and educational campaigns,
and 3- as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts,
and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence….”.
While Nkrumah viewed his action as legitimate and constitutional given its peaceful
character, this was a view that was wholly rejected by the British administration.
Arthur Creech Jones (Secretary of State for the Colonies from in the Attlee
Government from October 1946) made the position of the government clear and it
is necessary here to quote him at length;
“…
it has for some time been the
publicly announced programme of the CPP to secure its aims by the threat of
‘positive action’, consisting of nationwide strikes, boycotts, etc. designed to
bring the administration and the economic life of the country to a standstill.
While it is claimed to be ‘constitutional’ and ‘non-violent’, a programme of
political strikes directed at the Government is in fact unconstitutional and
illegal and was repeatedly declared to be so by the Gold Coast Government who
warned Nkrumah personally that political strikes directed against the
government were illegal and were bound, under African conditions, to lead to
violence and disorder, and that he would be held responsible for the
consequences.”
As a result of ‘positive action’,
which led to widespread disturbances in the Gold Coast in 1950, Nkrumah was
imprisoned by the British, and was seen at this point as representing a
dangerous and extreme new trend in the politics of the Gold Coast. The British
also raised concerns about his perceived Communist sympathies. While the Foreign
Office recognised that “Dr. Danquah, the leader of the United Gold Coast
Convention… resents any imputation of Communist connection [sic] or sympathy” they
believed that “Kwame Nkrumah … the head of the extreme nationalist Convention
People’s Party, and former member of the British Communist Party, is a much
more dangerous character”.
This
difficult relationship between the British and the newly-formed CPP was
fundamentally altered by the 1951 election in which they won a famous victory.
Before
the election the British approach did seek to limit the influence of Nkrumah
and the CPP. This is reflected by the musings to Sir Charles Arden Clarke of
A.B. Cohen (Assistant Under-Secretary of State responsible for the Africa
Division of the Colonial Office); to Arden Clarke he enquired “Is the fact that
he [Nkrumah] is in prison likely to improve the chances of the CPP winning more
seats in the Legislature?” adding “when Nkrumah does come out of prison is it
likely to be better for the working of the new Constitution that he should be
inside the Legislature…?”
After
the election the British radically shifted their attitude towards Nkrumah and
the CPP. Given the fact that they proved far more receptive partners in
government than had previously been supposed the British went so far as to seek
to boost the esteem with which Nkrumah and his party colleagues were regarded.
The transition from imprisoning Nkrumah and other prominent members of the CPP
was remarkably quick, yet it was obvious to the British that Nkrumah was in
fact someone with whom they could organise the business of government, and
prepare the Gold Coast for independence. This became apparent given the CPP’s
early performances in the Legislature following the election. Commenting on
this surprising moderation of CPP policies Arden Clark stated in a return
letter to Cohen written after the election that; “Indeed the record of the CPP
majority in the Assembly is somewhat remarkable. They have adopted as a working
basis, without any significant amendment, the budget which they did not prepare
and which contained features they did not like; they decisively defeated a
motion which was popularly interpreted as advocating ‘self-government now.’”
Another reason why the British sought to conduct the business of government
with Nkrumah was the fact that after the election there was no alternative to
the CPP that could form a majority government within the Legislature. A fear
presided in this situation that any alternative to the CPP that could form a
government would be more extreme in its tendencies, and made it necessary for
the British to build the esteem of the CPP. This fear was expressed Arden
Clarke; “The dominant feature of the present situation is the fact that there
is no alternative to a Government in which the CPP holds the majority. If this
Government were to fall … it can only be replaced by a Government of similar
complexion or of even more extreme nationalist tendencies” adding that “It has,
therefore, been necessary for me to take every justifiable measure to bolster
up the prestige of Nkrumah and his colleagues.”
It was this concern coupled with the more moderate tendencies of the CPP once
they had received the opportunity to form a government that was the main
stimulus of the shift in British attitudes towards Nkrumah and the CPP. Although
the British did enjoy the moderation of CPP policies they had to make some
concessions given the fact that the platform on which they had formed a
government was ‘self-government now’. Indeed the CPP had specified in their
election manifesto “… that Self-Government is the only solution to the evils
that plague us, and therefore must be fought for and won now….”
While the British did perceive this shift as being forced upon them they
remained consummately aware of what the potential alternatives were. On this
point Jim Griffiths’ Private Secretary Mr. A. Mackintosh points out that “We
may be forced, if we are to keep on good terms with more responsible political
leaders such as Mr. Nkrumah and his immediate colleagues and not force the Gold
Coast Government into the hands of extremists, to move more rapidly than
ideally we should wish.”
It
was for this reason that on the 20
th February 1951 Nkrumah was
declared the Leader of Government Business in essence the
de facto Prime
Minister.
This was a point that
Arden Clarke elucidated on and it is necessary here to quote him at length;
“Although every opportunity has been
taken to inspire the leaders of the Party with confidence that they can work
the present constitution, they remain exposed to continuous attacks on the
score that they are not fulfilling their primary undertaking to procure
‘self-government now’ – an undertaking to which they owe their position in
Government today. I do not know for how long they can or will wish to withstand
this pressure but we must be prepared for moves for further constitutional
advance in the not too distant future. Ministers have already given evidence,
during informal talks with me, of the desire to see immediate steps taken to
build up Nkrumah into a Prime Minister de facto.”
This willingness on the part of the
British administration to speed up the processes of turning over more
responsibilities of governance to the CPP, as mentioned above, was in large
part owing to the awareness that an alternative to them could constitute coping
with extremists within the Gold Coast. This fed into the British and indeed the
Western fear of Communist infiltration, which will be the next issue we shall
discuss in this essay.
While the British were making
significant concessions to the CPP, recognising both the nature of their
political base and prospective alternatives, Nkrumah too proved eager to seek
approval from the British for his political programme. In October 1953 Nkrumah
suspended from the CPP Anthony Woode and
E.C. Turcson-Ocran for association with the “international Communist labour
[sic] front”; the World Federation of Trade Unions.
Nkrumah took these actions as well as imposing other limitations on the movements
in and out of the country of Communist literature and people suspected of
Communist affiliation or sympathies, in order to placate the fears of the
British government that Communism might infiltrate the Gold Coast. Under the
Conservative Governments of Churchill and then Eden this fear appears to have
become more overt as Arden Clarke received despatches urging him to ensure that
all possible measures were being taken to combat potential Soviet infiltration
of the Gold Coast. It appeared to the Conservative Government that the moves
Nkrumah was taking were not radical enough and an element of suspicion still
surrounded him. In one such despatch from W.L. Gorell Barnes (Assistant
Under-Secretary of State Responsible for the Africa Division in the Churchill
Government from 1952) expresses concerns regarding; “reports reaching us,
including the LIC (Local Intelligence Committee) Notes, which give the
impression the Communist activity in the Gold Coast had earlier seemed slight
is increasing in amount and effectiveness”. Barnes further expresses concern
regarding the CPP itself adding that; “Ever since the CPP took office some
senior members of the Party have maintained old Communist contacts or have
flirted with Communism. Nkrumah has regularly turned to the Trotskyite Padmore
for advice.”
The concern expressed
here by Barnes still originated from the belief that; “It would be a great
disaster if the first British African territory to approach self-government
fell increasingly under Communist Domination.”
The
pessimism of the Government in London was not shared by those on the ground in the
Gold Coast such as Arden Clarke. In response to Barnes’ concerns about the Gold
Coast and the CPP Arden Clarke took a significantly different view replying
that; “Nkrumah and other ministers are becoming increasingly, if gradually,
aware of the dangers attendant on Communist infiltration and of the importance
of building up confidence in the Gold Coast in the non-Communist world”. Arden
Clarke elucidated on his position of relative optimism, which is again worth
quoting at length;
“I do not wish to give the impression
that the Communist threat is being underrated. But any consideration of
Communism in the Gold Coast must take account of the West African character. The
sophisticated African’s first loyalty is to himself and his prestige. Loyalty
towards an abstract ideology is an extremely rare thing, and I do not think
that Communism can be regarded at present as a significant political factor.”
In
spite of Arden Clarke’s input on the issue of Communism in the Gold Coast, his
views were rejected and the need to prevent any prospective Communist influence
was reaffirmed to him, this time by Sir Thomas Lloyd (Permanent Under-Secretary
of State in the Colonial Office from 1947). Lloyd warned Arden Clarke that
while; “It may be politically easier to wait a year or so, or even longer,
before taking positive steps, but from the Secretary of State’s point of view
this is hardly likely to give him the assurance he requires that Ministers not
only understand the dangers but are prepared to act.”
As time progressed Arden Clarke became more in line with London in relation to
Communism in the Gold Coast, and while his views may not have shifted in
relation to the possibility of a ‘home-grown’ Communist movement, he did echo
the views of many in London and the West with regard to the potential for the
growth of the influence of the Soviet Union in the affairs of the Gold Coast. On
this issue Arden Clarke stated that; “A main danger lies in the possibility of
efforts by the Soviet Union to undermine internal stability and Western
interests. Although West Africa is a far cry from the Middle East or the Sudan,
it seems not only possible but probable that an attempt will be made to penetrate
the Gold Coast by economic means.” Arden Clarke then goes on to assert that;
“If the United Kingdom is to maintain its commercial position here, everything
possible must be done to increase the confidence of Ministers of commercial,
transportation and other concerns.”
While
global issues, such as the threat of Communism, played an important role in the
British approach to administration and decolonisation in the Gold Coast,
internal issues played as much a role in British thinking as did global ones.
It is to these issues that we will now turn in examining the conflict that
arose between the CPP, Nkrumah and the traditional forms of power that existed
in the Gold Coast; the chiefs.
The election of 1951
consolidated the reduction in power of chieftaincy throughout the Gold Coast, a
move that had been gathering pace for over a decade. Chieftaincy was dependent
for its influence on a receding colonial administration, which was set on
massively reforming local government and a new political party, which was
hostile in increasing measure to chieftaincy.
In a relatively short time chiefs found that they were no longer powerful,
indispensable figures and were pushed into an increasingly marginal position.
In the cabinet formed after the 1951 election the Ashanti and the Northern
Territories were forced to accept only two of eleven portfolios of the cabinet
(having previously demanded four), a cabinet in which the CPP held six of the
eleven portfolios. The chiefs had attempted to form a shadow government but
were reminded by Arden Clarke that they were not a political party, and that in
doing so they would be committing political suicide.
That
the CPP were hostile to the idea of giving power to chieftaincy was understood
by the British, it was similarly understood by the British that the chiefs were
distinctly displeased with this situation. Not long after the election of 1951
Arden Clarke stated that; “The chiefs are becoming ill at ease in an Assembly
where they are accorded none of the traditional respect which has been paid
them in the past; at the same time they are being attacked in the rear in their
own States”. He elaborates on these attacks informing us that; “In each case
the inspiration has come from supporters of the CPP and although the Party
officially denies that its engaged in subversive activities against the Chiefs,
there is little doubt that it would be glad to see the departure from public
life of the more able and experienced Chiefs who do not subscribe to the
Party’s claim to political leadership.” Arden Clarke also points out on this
issue another underlying cause of the animosity between the chiefs and the CPP,
he states that; “It must be remembered that the CPP is the Party of the young
men, who in the past have been suppressed and denied any part in the management
of their State affairs.” He adds that; “They are now reacting with some
turbulence and the agitation against the Chiefs is a symptom of their
impatience for reform, coupled with their desire to pay off old scores.”
As a result of the acrimonious relationship between the CPP and the chiefs a
number of de-stoolments of chiefs took place, and while some were the result of
variations in readings of ‘tradition’ others had national political overtones.
Concerns
raised about the number of these de-stoolments were addressed in Parliament and
was explained in the following terms;
“This movement against the Chiefs
apparently derives from the part played by the Chiefs in the General Election
and the desire of the CPP for political vengeance; it does not appear, however,
to be centrally inspired. Dr. Nkrumah is believed to have discouraged overt
intervention by the CPP although local members of the CPP have taken a
prominent role in de-stoolment. It appears rather to have been caused by a
surge of genuine popular feeling against the political role played by the
Chiefs in the central and Local Government, a result of the young men who are
now aware of their power.”
As
time progressed this gulf between chieftaincy and the central authority of the
government widened. The Ashanti sought special treatment for their region, a
move that was rejected by the British. The efforts of the Ashanti and the
chiefs in the North to reassert their political power were consistently and
continuously met with negative responses from the British and the CPP. As a
result of this and the sweeping return to power of the CPP in the elections
(albeit with a slightly reduced majority) 1954 saw the foundation of the
National Liberation Movement (NLM); this would provide a unified opposition to
CPP dominance.
While the British at
times showed sympathy in increasing the influence of regional concerns in
national politics they always stopped short of devolution and federalisation,
the latter being the primary aim of the NLM. On this issue Arden Clarke
provides us with insight into the reasoning behind the rejection of the
Asanteman Council’s appeal for federal constitution in late 1954. Of this he
says;
The Asanteman Council’s resolution is
a sign, but no more than a sign, that the country will not accept unqualified
dictation from the centre and, as such, it is a healthy manifestation of the
feelings of a considerable proportion of the population. The resolution,
however, is misguided in that it urges a solution which is not practicable.
While, therefore, I shall continue to work for the recognition of regional
interests by the Government and for freer consultation between the Government
and regional bodies, I cannot support the resolution.”
The
conflict between the CPP and the chiefs remained until after the British had
declared the independence of Ghana. The NLM and Nkrumah were irreconcilable as
the NLM wanted to settle for nothing less than a federal constitution. The
fundamentals of this divergence of the local and the national, and the
subsequent assaults on the power of Nkrumah by the NLM were recognised by the
British as follows; “The attack on Dr. Nkrumah’s powers as Prime Minister
derives partly from the deep distrust of him felt in the NLM and in part from
the fear that a strong Central Government in the Gold Coast must inevitably
continue to take away from chiefs (among whom the Asantehene is pre-eminent)
and other traditional authorities most of their power and dignity”
Nkrumah’s
view of this conflict between chieftaincy and centralism was of a much more
‘cut and dry’ nature. For Nkrumah;
“The past year
has not been an easy time for any of us but at the same time I do appreciate
that when we travel at the speed we have done over the last four or five years,
it is difficult to expect everyone to be able to adjust his mind and customs
with equal rapidity. This is especially so when the adjustment entails a jump
from old age feudalism to twentieth century democracy.”
Neither the
British nor Nkrumah were willing to meet the demands of the NLM, nor were the
fundamental issues involved resolved before independence. The NLM advanced as a
political force and contested the 1956 general election. This election in many
ways can be seen as the last act of politics in the Gold Coast, before it
became Ghana in March 1957. The remaining months of direct British involvement
was dedicated to winding down the business of Empire in the Gold Coast. In many
ways, while the face of politics in the Gold Coast had shifted immensely from
the foundation of the CPP to the foundation of the NLM, there was still a great
deal of continuity. This was reflected in the results of the 1956 election and
the continuing dominance of the CPP; taking 71 of 104 seats, which cleared the
way for independence eight months later. The reasonable majority the British
requested as a prerequisite for the grant of independence had been met.
The British approach to
decolonisation in the Gold Coast was coloured by an array of different
concerns. The country was of immense importance in that it would be seen as
providing the template for those countries that were also on the road to
independence in West Africa and throughout Africa as a whole. Dominating the
whole era from the foundation of the ubiquitous CPP to independence was the
relationship between Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Charles Arden Clarke. Nkrumah
described this relationship as; “beginning with doubts, suspicions and
misunderstandings, then acknowledging the growth of trust, sincerity and
friendship.”
Arden Clarke told R.J.
Vile (Assistant Secretary Head of West Africa Department ‘B’ from 1954) in
early 1956 that “their [Arden Clarke and Nkrumah] personal friendship was as
deep as ever.”
It would have been
tremendously difficult to envisage how this friendship could have developed
between these two men as things stood in 1949. However, both Nkrumah and Arden
Clarke and the politics they represented underwent significant shifts in a
respectful recognition of their respective positions. There were great
difficulties that needed to be overcome before independence could become a
political reality in the Gold Coast. Primary amongst all of these in the
planning of British governments was the threat that Communism presented to
those nations of the world that had either an active nationalist movement or
were newly independent. In the realities of the post World War II world there
was no nation, regardless of how strategically insignificant it was regarded as
being, that could escape from the divisions developing throughout the globe in
the fight between ‘Freedom’ and ‘Totalitarianism’ that was the Cold War. There
were however significant local issues as well as global ones. These manifested
themselves in the form of conflict between the ‘traditional’ seats of power in
the Gold Coast; the chiefs, and the new centralised government situated in
Accra. While the British were unable to assist the CPP or the chiefs in
attaining closure on this issue, they withdrew on the basis that the CPP
provided sufficient stability to make the transition to independence. British
thinking on these issues was not always uniform travelling between London and
the Gold Coast, and the approaches they took in steering the Gold Coast towards
independence were often made out of the consideration of making sure that the
first African nation that would attain self-government would do so in a stable
manner, while maintaining its links to its former master.
- Arden Clarke, Charles, ‘Gold Coast into
Ghana: Some Problems of Transition’, in International Affairs 34,
No. 1 (1958), 49-56
- Austin, Dennis, Politics in
Ghana 1946-1960, (London, 1964)
- Howell, Thomas A. and
Rajasooria, Jeffrey P., (eds.), Ghana and Nkrumah, (New York, 1972)
- Metcalfe, G.E., (ed.), Great
Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History 1807-1957, (London, 1964)
- Nkrumah, Kwame, The Autobiography of
Kwame Nkrumah, (London, 1957)
- Rathbone, Richard, (ed.), British
Documents and the End of Empire: Ghana Volumes 1 & 2, (London, 1992)
- Rathbone, Richard, Nkrumah and
the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, (Oxford, 2000)
- Twumasi, Yaw, ‘J. B. Danquah: Towards
an Understanding of the Social and Political Ideas of a Ghanaian Nationalist
and Politician’, in African Affairs 77, No. 306 (1978), 73-88
