Tuesday 1 January 2013

PROPAGANDA PART I of III



This is a portion of a thesis that I wrote, which  I have done my best to alter into a stand alone piece. If there are references to earlier chapters or a bizarre amount of assumed knowledge then please let me know or feel free to ask for greater detail on specific points in the comments box. Also since this is a later chapter and I am ostensibly a lazy creature I have kept the shortened form on the footnotes so if you find a quote or idea to be particularly compelling and want more information on the source then you know the drill. The language may also seem truncated in parts because of heavy editing of the bits that say "in the previous chapter". I have also provided links to people and works where possible. Enjoy :)
A REVOLUTION IS TAKING PLACE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION (CPI) INNOVATION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE POST FIRST WORLD WAR WORLD


“When by various processes an idea has ended by penetrating into the minds of crowds, it possesses and irresistible power, and brings about a series of effects, opposition to which is bootless.”
                                                                                  -GUSTAVE LE BONi


                      The CPI employed an array of methods in order to promote the the First World War to the American public; methods such as the oratorical ubiquity of the Four Minute Men, the emotive imagery of the war that was disseminated by the Division of Pictorial Publicity and themes of the wartime motion picture industry. Here it will be examined how these methods and others originated by the CPI provided a revolutionary new framework within which propagandists worked after the war. These methods left an indelible impact on the operations and theories of propagandists that operated throughout the twentieth century, some of whom actively participated in the work of the CPI.                                                             
                     At this time, just after the war though before the Nye Commission,+ there was a subsidence of criticisms of corporate America, given its role in production during the war. The combination of the new found friendliness towards corporations, as well as the increased recognition of the importance of shaping public attitudes led to what Stuart Ewen identifies as the animation “of a growing class of American intellectuals as they moved from war service back into civilian life”.[1] To these intellectuals whose ideas were informed by their own activities with the CPI “public opinion became something to be mobilised and managed; while the public mind was now seen as an entity to be manufactured, not reasoned with”.[2]
                       The contemporary awareness of these new trends can be traced back to the prevalent political analyst Walter Lippmann, who tells us in his 1922 work Public Opinion when discussing what he terms the “manufacture of consent” that “…with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power”.[3] This revolution, which began with the CPI, was influential in the evolution of some of what are now considered the basic principles of effective communication; principles such as unity of voice, source credibility and message simplicity.[4]
                        These developments however, had been showing their roots, at least in terms of ideation, in the late nineteenth century in the works of people like Gustave Le Bon; author of The Crowd. Similarly the coming of elite interest in public opinion as a potentially meddlesome force in elite affairs can be seen to develop in the work of Lord Bryce in his 1888 work The American Commonwealth. It was World War I however, that provided the mechanism for jump starting industries of national persuasion. This was so in terms of practical application; while the ideas of social psychology examined public opinion in the abstract the CPI provided their first centred and coherent application to a society. Through the CPI this industry as well as refining its methods and ideas, became very much at ease with the idea of guiding the public mind.[5] At the core of this refinement was Edward Bernays who, although little recognised until relatively recently, provided the framework through which the business of advertising and public relations functioned. Though Bernays was not alone in these innovations, others such as Carl Byoir and Ivy Lee deserve mention; he was by far the person who wrote the most about the guiding principles of mass persuasion. Bernays lived to be 103 years old and wrote voluminously throughout much of his life on the ideas that underpinned the moulding of the public mind.
                    While Bernays in considered to be the ‘Father of Spin’[6] it is evident that he was drawing on ideas that had been percolating for some time.[7] Bernays drew ideas not just from the influential social psychologist Gustave LeBon but others who in the intervening years had sought to re-evaluate his work. With the growth of the field of social psychology and psychoanalysis, the latter of which was the innovation of Bernays’ uncle Sigmund Freud, there came efforts to be as scientific as possible about approaches to guiding the opinions of the public. It was Bernays who utilised the approaches of Le Bon in The Crowd and of Wilfred Trotter in Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War[8] to formulate new ways to approach the moulding of public opinion. While he conceded that: “Mass psychology is as yet far from being an exact science”, he does recognise Trotter and Le Bon as those “who approached the subject in a scientific manner” as well as being those “who established that the group has mental characteristics distinct from those of the individual…”[9]
                   It is Trotter’s use of the word ‘instinct’ that interests us most here, as in spite of George Creel's assertions that the CPI did not appeal to the emotional or instinctual reactions of the public to their campaigns, the legacy of its work was specifically aimed at doing so. Worthy of note on this point is the work of Graham Wallas, the English social psychologist who broke from the accepted longstanding belief in rationalism, which he discusses as an “intellectualist fallacy”.[10] Instead Wallas contends that: “The empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of sub-conscious irrational inference.”[11] Lippmann was a student of Wallas and a follower of his ideas [12] and concludes in a similar vein that: “it [public opinion] is an irrational force”. He goes on to say that: “under favourable institutions, sound leadership and decent training the power of public opinion might be placed at the disposal of those who stood for workable law over brute assertion.”[13]
                   What is witnessed here then is the confluence of ideas and opportunity. While the ideas of Trotter, Freud, Le Bon and Wallas were being formulated, the war as well as advances in technology i.e. radio and cinema, presented the opportunity to employ them in new and revolutionary ways. While this convergence of ideas and physical realities emerged in the late 19th/early 20th centuries it still required individual ingenuity, like that of Bernays and Lippmann, to recognise and advance the new conditions that had presented themselves. Stuart Ewen tells us of Lippmann and Bernays that: “Together, the impact of these men on the shape of twentieth-century American society would be colossal.”[14] Just as Lippmann recognised that opinion should be guided by ‘favourable institutions’ Bernays laid down the framework for how this could be done. In cataloguing the complex and multi-layered approaches of opinion shapers Bernays tells us at the very beginning of his 1928 work Propaganda that:
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised [sic] habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.”[15]
                   What Bernays set forth in his extensive literature on propaganda and public relations (a term he coined) was a map for how elites, be they industrial or political, could manipulate the opinions of the majority. This was conducted with a view to winning them around to a certain point of view or to an awareness of the virtues of a particular product. Bernays himself viewed these new techniques not simply as a product of modern democratic society but as vital to its proper functioning. On this point he wrote in 1928 that:
“The innovator, the leader, the special pleader for new ideas, has through necessity developed a new technique-the psychology of public persuasion. Through the application of this new psychology he is able to bring about changes in public opinion that will make for the acceptance of new doctrines, beliefs, and habits.”[16]
It was the belief of Lippmann and Bernays that democracy could properly function through the intelligent utilisation of these ideas alone, because as the latter tells us: “only by mastering the techniques of communication can leadership be exercised fruitfully in the vast complex that is modern democracy in the United States.”[17] Bernays further contended in 1942 that: “the engineering approach to public relations…can be carried out on a democratic basis of suggestion and persuasion”.[18]
                   While for government the ‘conscious and intelligent manipulation’ of opinion was, in Bernays’ and Lippmann’s eyes at least, a necessity business had other concerns. The chief concern of business was the threat of mass production leading to overproduction. While Bernays scolded political elites for being the “slowest in modifying its propaganda methods to meet the changed conditions of the public mind” he applauded business as it “continually improved those methods in the course of its competitive struggle”.[19] It was imperative for business to maintain production while staving off the threat of overproduction. It was the prospect of this becoming a reality that owed itself to the fact that business adapted to new methods of propaganda with far greater aplomb than politics. As Bernays tells us: “Mass production is profitable only if its rhythm can be maintained.” As a consequence of this the mode that previously dominated the economic relationship between seller and consumer was reversed. Whereas previously “demand had created the supply” it was now the reality that “supply must actively seek to create its corresponding demand.”[20] What this amounted to in essence was the utilisation of ‘propaganda’ to transfer the focus of the American market based capitalist society from a need to a desire based culture.
                    Perhaps the best known of Bernays’ many campaigns in the service of business and politics fused contemporary elements of both, and sought to drive at least half of America towards a new desire; the cigarette. This was the now legendary ‘Torches of Freedom’ campaign, which sought to lift the taboo on women smoking in the late 1920s. During this period Bernays counted among his many prestigious clients the American Tobacco Corporation, who were naturally eager to challenge this taboo and in effect double the market for their product.  In investigating this taboo Bernays consulted one of the leading psychoanalysts in the United States at the time, Dr. A.A.Brill, who informed Bernays that “cigarettes, which were equated with men, become torches of freedom”.[21] Examining the political climate Bernays was aware of the on-going struggles for women’s rights. These fed naturally into his idea that: “A public relations campaign must take into consideration the group relationships of society and the dominant instincts of people”.[22] Furthermore he wrote that the goal of a campaign must “reconcile the actual objective with the preconceptions, the preoccupations, and the existing attitudes of the many sections of the public.”[23] In a similar vein Harold Lasswell explains that: “we may say that it [propaganda] involves the presentation of an object in a culture in such a manner that certain cultural attitudes will be organized toward it.”[24]
                     What Bernays did with this information was organise during the Easter Sunday Parade in New York (a holiday that symbolised freedom of the spirit) for approximately thirty debutantes and prominent women to light cigarettes as a protest against male imposed standards and prejudices. Within days of the event that Bernays himself had orchestrated national and local newspapers were broadcasting reports of women taking to the streets and smoking in Boston, Detroit and San Francisco.[25] What he had achieved through his appeal to the emotions was to make an erroneous connection between cigarettes and greater equality for women, yet it was one for which all the symbolism worked.» For example the reference to ‘torches of liberty’ clearly echoed Lady Liberty’s torch, which given the setting of New York took on its own significance. Indeed Lady Liberty had already provided a rich source for emotive appeals in the wartime propaganda posters of the CPI. It is difficult however, to make the case that the lifting of the taboo on women smoking in public gave women any substantial or substantive degree of equality. It is this component of public relations and propaganda methods, which originated in the activities of the CPI that is its most long-lasting legacy. Such appeals to emotions and not reason, which are often erroneous and irrational, form connections for the public between products, political figures or political ideas and links them with certain ideals; either the ideals of the society or the ideals of the self. In this instance Bernays utilised the abstract idea of freedom and gave it a physical presence; the cigarette.
                     What this campaign also did, which was a recurring theme of CPI activities during the war, was not merely to create news events but also to create conversations. In creating news events the ‘propagandist’, or to use Bernays’ favoured term the public relations counsel,[26] sought to create the centrepiece of people’s conversation after the event. As with the Four Minute Men, which formed the keystone of the strategy to enter people’s daily lives, the shapers of opinion were men of stature within their community.[27] In lieu of the existence of the Four Minute Men it was the press that became the primary instigator of conversation, and it was the editors of the same press that took on the mantle of the man of stature. As sociologist Edward Ross points out: “The public can receive suggestions through the columns of its journal, the editor of which is like the chairman of a mass meeting, for no one can be heard without his recognition.”[28] As radio and television entered the spectrum of daily American life in more substantial ways over time it was the editors of these media that were also charged with providing the pervading topic of conversation. Again these ideas can be traced to the work of social psychologists at the turn of the century. As French social psychologist Gabriel Tarde pointed out in 1898:
“newspapers have transformed…unified in space and diversified in time, the conversations of individuals, even those who do not read papers but who, talking to those who do, are forced to follow the groove of their borrowed thoughts. One pen suffices to set off a million tongues”[29]
                     Having discussed above how the ideas and methods of propaganda developed after the war, as well as ideas about its role in democracy, we shall now turn to the debate that ensued over this role. In this discussion we will highlight some of the debates and criticisms of the ideas of Bernays and Lippmann and will chart their increasingly trenchant nature as the 20th century progressed.


iv Le Bon, The Crowd, 52-53
+ The Nye Commission, officially known as the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry was a US Senate investigation chaired by Senator Gerald Nye (R- North Dakota). The Committee examined the link between the US entry into World War I and financial and banking interests.
[1] Ewen, PR!, 126
[2] Ewen, PR!, 127
[3] Lippmann, Public Opinion, 231
[4]  Bruce Pinkleton, ‘The Campaign of the Committee on Public Information: Its Contributions to the History and Evolution of Public Relations’, in Journal of Public Relations Research 6, No. 4 (1994): p.229
[5] Ewen, Captains of Consciousness, 11-12
[6] For Example Larry Tye’s biography of Bernays utilises this title.
[7] Stuart Ewen, ‘Introduction’, in Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, 14
[8] Wilfred Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, (London, 1921) –Originally Published 1916
[9] Bernays, Propaganda, 71                                                    
[10] Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, (London, 1908), p.25, 28 See also Ewen, PR!, 136
[11] Wallas, Human Nature, xi
[12] Ewen, PR!, 136
[13] Lippman, Phantom Public, 59
[14] Ewen, PR!, 146
[15] Bernays, Propaganda, 37
[16] Edward Bernays, ‘Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and The How’, in  The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 6 (May, 1928): p.959
[17] Bernays, ‘The Engineering of Consent’, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 250, (Mar., 1947): p. 113
[18] Edward Bernays, ‘The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda’, The Journal of Marketing 6, No. 3 (1942), 241
[19] Bernays, Propaganda, 110
[20] Bernays, Propaganda, 84
[21] quoted in Tye, The Father of Spin, 28
[22] Edward Bernays, ‘Molding Public Opinion’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 179, (1935): p.84
[23] Bernays, ‘Molding Public Opinion’, 86
[24] Lasswell, ‘The Theory of Political Propaganda’, 629
[25] Tye, The Father of Spin, 28-31
» For video of Bernays discussing the ‘Torches of Freedom’ campaign see:   http://www.prmuseum.com/bernays/bernays_video_torches.html
[26] For Bernays discussing the origins and ‘necessity’ of this profession see Edward Bernays, ‘Emergence of the Public Relations Counsel: Principles and Recollections’, in  The Business History Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn, 1971): pp. 296-316
[27] Ewen, PR!, 117-119
[28] Edward Ross, Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book, (New York, 1908), p.64
[29] Gabriel Tarde, ‘Opinion and Conversation’, (1898), in Terry N. Clark, (ed.) Gabriel Tarde: On Communication and Social Influence Selected Papers, (Chicago, 1969), p.304

PROPAGANDA PART II of III




DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
THE DEBATE ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF PROPAGANDA IN THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY

 
“What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”
                                                                          -WOODROW WILSONi



“One of the advantages of democracy, from the governmental point of view, is that it makes the average citizen easier to deceive, since he regards the government as his government.”
                                                                          -BERTRAND RUSSELLii

                   As was discussed in part one of this piece there were some, most notably Bernays and Lippmann who provided our focus, that viewed propaganda as vital to the functioning of democracy. There were others however, that did not share their views about the course society was taking as a result of the increased and intensified efforts of propagandists to enter into the discourse of daily American life. It is the clash of these conflicting ideas and the debate that ensued as a consequence that shall form the basis of this part. While we shall take as our focus in this part the implications propaganda had for democracy, it is worth noting that totalitarian dictatorships, particularly that of Nazi Germany,[1] also utilised many of the guiding principles being pioneered in America. Indeed Bernays was informed by journalist Karl von Wiegand in 1933 that Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels was using his book Crystallizing Public Opinion in the destructive campaign against the Jews; a fact about which he expressed great shock.[2] Goebbels was evidently not overly concerned by the implicit ironies involved with his utilisation of the works of an Austrian born Jew for the purposes of advancing National Socialism’s repellent ideology.
                   During the 1920s when ideas of propaganda in its modern connotation were still being refined the debate over propaganda’s function in a democracy was dominated by two men; Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. It should be noted from the outset however, that both Lippmann and Dewey in this debate did share a degree of common ground. In no way can it be characterised as reminiscent or suggestive of some of the more infamously acerbic intellectual debates such as Freud and Jung or more recently Dershowitz and Finkelstein. As Sue Curry Jansen tells us Dewey and Lippmann were in many ways allies as both were seeking “to reform democracy in light of modern conditions, which included the emergence of mass communication.”[3] Both men ostensibly agreed that the American democratic process was far from an ideal political institution and differed primarily in prescription.[4] For example Lippmann states that: “Never has democratic theory been able to conceive itself in the context of a wide and unpredictable environment.”[5] Similarly Dewey tells us that: “The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified by the state even at its best.”[6]
                   The essential divergence between Dewey and Lippmann was chiefly concerned with what role the public should have in the less than ideal existing form of democracy. Lippmann contended that it was highly impracticable, if not impossible, for citizens to be sufficiently well informed to participate in democracy on issues of economics, science or foreign affairs.[7] He writes in Public Opinion of public’s perceptions of the world, which he states are based largely on stereotypes, prejudices and preconceptions, which stood in opposition to the realities of “the world outside the pictures in our heads.”[8] He argues that this discrepancy between the “picture inside” and “the outside world” is what “so often misleads men in their dealings” with political reality.[9] Lippmann added later in The Phantom Public to his reasoning as to why proper methods of propaganda were essential if the admittedly imperfect American democracy was to function. On this point he states:
“Since the general opinions of large numbers of persons are almost certain to be a vague and confusing medley, action cannot be taken until these opinions have been factored down, canalised [sic], compressed and made uniform. The making of one general will out of a multitude is not an Hegelian mystery…but an art well known to leaders, politicians and steering committees. It consists essentially in the use of symbols which assemble emotions after they have been detached from their ideas.”[10]
In a direct response to this idea Dewey writes:
“The pretence [sic] of a common mind and general action in behalf of things at large has only bred fictions, and these fictions have increased confusion, have put a premium on deceptions and propaganda. The outcome of course is that action is as much determined in private by a few insiders as ever it was. But falsification has come in; acting for ends of their own, they claim to be the agents of a public will and to have public support and sanction, and to get the latter as a working force, they bamboozle the public.”[11]                  
                 As we can see, in contrast to Lippmann’s views, Dewey believed that democracy required the active participation of its citizens in the formation and enactment of important political decisions.[12] Dewey in seeking to refute the somewhat negative prospects for public involvement in democracy as outlined by Lippmann stated of Public Opinion that: “it is the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned.”[13] The alternative Dewey offers to this ‘indictment of democracy’ was a move away from the utilisation of propaganda, putting in its stead more democratic methods of inquiry and education.[14] The deprivation of these methods was, Dewey states: “the problem of the public.” The remedying of this problem was: “The essential need, in other words, the improvement of methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.”[15] Dewey recognised the difficulties that accompanied the prospects of any such environment of democratic methods of inquiry and debate. Such democratic methods were at every turn undermined by "publicity agents manufacturing public opinion" as well as "government by press agents, by 'counsellors of public relations', by propaganda in press and school".[16] It was Dewey’s belief that:
“Until secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda … are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for judgement of social policies the existing intelligence of the masses may be.”[17]
                 Dewey was not alone in his beliefs, and while the criticisms levelled against propaganda became increasingly frequent and trenchant later in the 20th century, there were others at this time that shared his ideas. One such distinguished observer of these trends was American theologian and commentator Reinhold Niebuhr. In his 1932 work Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr states; “Contending factions in a social struggle require morale; and morale is created by the right dogmas, symbols and emotionally potent oversimplifications” further stating that “No class of industrial workers will ever win freedom from the dominant classes if they give themselves completely to the ‘experimental techniques’ of the modern educators”.[18]
                      One year later sociologist Frederick Lumley offered some practical advice to citizens on how to be aware of the promulgation of these ‘emotionally potent oversimplifications’ and thus avoid ‘giving themselves completely’ to these ‘experimental techniques of the modern educators’. Taking his cues from Dewey and Bertrand Russell, Lumley opines that: “the ultimate cure for propaganda seems to hang inseparably with a liberated intelligence, cooperatively searing its unthwartable way through every cherished doctrine and practice.” It was this Lumley added that “will operate to save him by giving the propagandists pause … by ruining the soil to which they are accustomed to plant their noxious seed.”[19]                  
                      While the capacity to reach a wider audience through technological advances continued to gather pace, and while people like Niebuhr, Lumley, Lippmann and Dewey debated to what end they should be used, Franklin Roosevelt entered the White House. While in some ways as Stuart Ewen tells us: “FDR was a prototypical twentieth century persuader, intuitively sophisticated about public psychology” as well as being “remarkably attuned to the modern media apparatus” he was simultaneously a believer in the possibility, as was recommended by Dewey, of an informed public debate.[20] He pronounced in 1938 that:
“Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely. The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education. It has been well said that no system of government gives so much to the individual or exacts so much as a democracy.”[21]
Similarly with the question of what was happening overseas, as the world moved ever closer to war, Roosevelt sought to inform public debate and saw himself “in the midst of the long process of education.”[22] While Roosevelt enacted an immense campaign to ‘educate’ the public about the ‘New Deal’, his approaches to public opinion were far more nuanced than the essentialist views.[23] Propagandists tended to vacillate between the two; informed rational public debate on the one hand and manipulation of opinion through marginalisation and censorship on the other, views which are encapsulated in the arguments of Dewey and Lippmann respectively.
                     Public attention at this time was being drawn increasingly towards the character of propaganda. As well as the highlighting of the dangers of external propaganda the public became more aware of business propaganda that sought to repeal the concessions granted to organised labour with accusations of Bolshevism.[24] Much of this propaganda was organised by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which sought to influence public opinion against Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ and the immense publicity campaigns that had been organised on its behalf. The NAM blamed the changes that were happening in industrial relations on “Communists”, “impatient reformers”, “disturbers” and “teacher propagandists”.[25] The extent of NAM agitation against the ‘New Deal’, as well as the increasing public awareness of corporate malfeasance and propaganda, led to the NAM becoming part of the investigations of a Senate Committee. The Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee Investigating Violations of Free Speech and the Rights of Labor, known as the La Follette Committee (1936-1941), named after its chairman Robert La Follette (Progressive –Wisconsin), gave a grave indictment of corporate propaganda. The La Follette Committee declared of the NAM that they had sought to: “render public opinion intolerant of the aims of social progress through legislative effort.”[26] It was furthermore said of the NAM by the La Follette Committee that it had:
“blanketed the country with a propaganda that in technique has relied upon indirection of meaning, and in presentation of secrecy and deception. Radio speeches, public meetings, news, cartoons, editorials, advertising, motion pictures and many other artifices of propaganda have not, in most instances, disclosed to the public their origin within the Association.”[27]
In spite of these revelations the NAM held together and after World War II continued, with many other business sponsored organisations, to disseminate widespread anti-Communist, anti-socialist, anti-union and anti-New Deal propaganda.[28]  
                     Also after that war Lippmann again played an important role, advancing ideas in opposition to the idea that the public could be sufficiently informed on matters of foreign affairs to play a significant part. The ideas of Lippmann, and political scientist Gabriel Almond, yielded a broad consensus in the post-war years (The Almond-Lippmann Consensus). This consensus was made up of the propositions regarding domestic opinion of foreign affairs: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies, (2) it lacks coherence or structure, but (3) in the final analysis, it has little if any impact on foreign policy.[29] The catalyst for re-evaluation of such beliefs was largely the Vietnam War.[30]
                      It was chiefly as a result of Vietnam that views such as the Almond-Lippmann consensus came to be challenged prompting in turn, a renewed and increasingly acerbic critique of propaganda. Prevalent amongst those offering this critique was sociologist, philosopher and political theorist Herbert Marcuse. In his 1964 work One-DimensionalMan Marcuse criticised the implications of propaganda for society, highlighting it as a specifically elite interest, stating that: “As the great words of freedom and fulfilment [sic] are pronounced by campaigning leaders and politicians, on the screens and radios and stages, they turn into meaningless sounds which obtain meaning only in the context of propaganda…”[31]
                      Arguably the most influential and best known of those who critique the implications of propaganda for democracy is linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky. Chomsky, who still works and writes in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believes that propaganda is compatible with only one view of democracy; a view of contempt. In his 1989 work Necessary Illusions, Chomsky decries the views of both Bernays and Lippmann, and sarcastically discusses “the ignorant public” that after World War II “reverted to their slothful pacifism.”[32] Similarly in his 1988 work Manufacturing Consent, (co-authored with Edward S. Herman), he contends democracy is significantly impoverished in its forms owing to the fact that: “In countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state bureaucracy, the monopolistic control over the media, often supplemented by official censorship, makes it clear that the media serve the ends of a dominant elite.”[33] For Chomsky the propagandist’s “logic is clear”, he writes that: “Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state. That's wise and good because, again, the common interests elude the bewildered herd. They can't figure them out.”[34]
                    What Chomsky, Dewey, Marcuse and others have offered since the end of World War I, as part of a process that accelerated during and after the 1960s, is a coherent, sustained though much controverted critique of the implications propaganda has for the democratic process. Standing in firm opposition to these ideas are the imposing figures of men like Walter Lippmann and Edward Bernays who postulate that not only is propaganda not harmful to democracy, it is in fact essential to its proper functioning. While criticisms have been levelled since the 1920s about the seemingly sinister underpinnings of propaganda, the constant and rapid changing face of today’s technology has rendered any future inferences as to the direction of mass communications singularly impossible. What none of these men could have been aware of as they wrote their treatise, with the possible exclusion of Noam Chomsky who sill writes today, is the extent to which mass communications would shift with the development of new technologies.  Though the advent of radio and television were adapted into the framework of their thought the power of the internet could not have been predicted; it being an inherently democratic medium through which every individual with access can now propagandise and disseminate ideas in their own corner of it. Consequently, according to Alan Axelrod with “all available information … available to everyone at all times … technology, not great thinkers and their great ideas, may create the apotheosis of democracy.”[35]            


i Woodrow Wilson, Address at Mount Vernon, July 4th 1918, (Washington, 1918) p.5
ii Russell, Power, 114
[1] For authoritative histories of propaganda and public opinion in Nazi Germany see Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945, (New York, 1983) & Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (New York, 1987)
[2] Tye, Father of Spin, 111 & Edward Bernays, Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel, (New York, 1965), p.652
[3] Jansen, ‘Phantom Conflict’, 222
[4] Whipple, ‘Dewey-Lippmann Debate Today’, 158-159
[5] Lippmann, Public Opinion, 250-251
[6] Dewey, Public and its Problems, 143
[7] Dell P. Champlin and Janet T. Knoedler, ‘The Media, the News, and Democracy: Revisiting the Dewey-Lippman Debate’, in Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 2006): p.137
[8] Lippmann, Public Opinion, 9-36
[9] Lippmann, Public Opinion, 32
[10] Lippmann, Phantom Public, 37
[11] Dewey, ‘Practical Democracy, 215
[12] Champlin and Knoedler, ‘Revisiting the Dewey-Lippmann Debate’, 138
[13] Dewey, ‘Review of Public Opinion’, 286
[14] James Farr, ‘John Dewey and American Political Science’, in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1999): pp. 520-541
[15] Dewey, Public and its Problems, 208
[16] Quoted in Farr, ‘Dewey and American Political Science’, 528
[17] Dewey, Public and its Problems, 209
[18] Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, (Kentucky, 2001), xxvii – Originally Published 1932
[19] Lumley, Propaganda Menace, 428
[20] Ewen, PR!, 241
[21] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message for American Education Week, September 27, 1938 – Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15545 –Accessed 16-7-2012
[22] Quoted in Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion and the War Against Nazi Germany, (New York, 2001), p.30
[23] Ewen, PR!, 240-241
[24] Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study, (New York, 1939), p.4
[25] Quoted in Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal’, (Indiana, 1966), p.147
[26] Quoted in Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 147
[27] Quoted in Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda Versus Freedom and Liberty, (Illinois, 1997), p.24
[28] Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy, 29
[29] Ole R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus’, in
 International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992): p.439
[30] Ole R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, 459
[31] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (New York, 2002), p.61 –Originally Published 1964
[32] Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control In Democratic Societies, (London, 1989), pp.16-18
[33] Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, (London, 1994)
[34] Noam Chomsky, Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, (California, 1991) –Available at  http://ics-www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=715&paper=1146 –Accessed 17-7-2012
[35] Axelrod, Selling the Great War, 226