Friday 25 May 2012

"Remember yout humanity, forget the rest"

Almost 57 years ago two of the greatest minds the world has ever known put their collective brilliance together to write one of the most significant manifestos ever written. While the manifesto is significant it is unfortunately not influential. The Russell-Eisntein Manifesto concerns the prospects for survival of humanity as a species, if the proliferation of nuclear arms is continued. Although it is tipping on towards being sixty years old, its continued relevance has been significantly reinforced owing to the fact that today there are many more nations either seeking, or actively controlling a nuclear arsenal than there were then. The words of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto put the paltry pronouncements of Obama, and others, who call for 'bipartisan cooperation' into context i.e. perhaps a real 'leader' would speak in terms of our species, instead of requesting that politics be momentarily sidelined. Other great minds and great communicators have also weighed in on this issue and present the stark realities of what a nuclear war might look like.


I was also reminded when writing this of the BBC docu-drama Threads, which after watching it made me an absolute write-off for the rest of the day. Although it may no longer be the Russians causing the most serious concerns the grim depiction of Threads cannot be considered far from what the reality of an urban deployment of a nuclear weapon would look like.


As long as there have been nuclear weapons there has been opposition to them and yet the chances now that an individual psychopath will lay their hands on material serviceable for nuclear weapons is a more real prospect than at any point in time previous. The most vocal and effective opposition group today, to both the aforementioned possibility and potential international conflicts, is the Global Zero movement, the stated aim of which is to eliminate all nuclear weapons. To this end they state that; "the only way to eliminate the nuclear threat — including proliferation and nuclear terrorism — is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, secure all nuclear materials and eliminate all nuclear weapons". The Global Zero movement were also instrumental in the production and distribution of the rather stark Countdown to Zero documentary. Although I could only find a trailer I am sure with sufficient searching one could easily track it down online. I worry not just about nuclear armageddon but also about dead links on my blog.


Also well worth watching is the movie Trinity and Beyond: The Atomic Bomb Movie, which is rendered all the more enjoyable by the brilliant narration of William Shatner. Again this is just a trailer.


While Trinity focusses explicitly on American nuclear tests, they are far from the only bogeymen in this particular and still evolving drama of potential atomic chaos. This is especially so given the potential for nuclear standoffs in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan. The former is ready to explode (excuse the pun) at any moment while the latter is always a fragile and uneasy peace at the best of times. Anyway even setting aside these international equivalents of UTV's Neighbours From Hell, there have still been an immensity of nuclear weapons already exploded in tests around the world.


Granted that the places this has happened have been remote; if one day they are transplanted to an urban centre the suffering inflicted would be unimaginable to anyone not already acquainted with the epicentre of such an event. One need only read the testimonials of those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August 1945 respectively, which are available here. It is also worth remembering that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are completely dwarfed in scale to those available today.

Although there is the Partial Test Ban Treaty, SALT and SALT II the fact that the materials required for making nuclear weapons still abound should be reason enough to fear the prospects for what may transpire to be the terminal phase in human evolution. It appears given the fact that human beings are excellent at inventing new ways of killing themselves, the assertion that intelligence may not be beneficial in evolutionary terms may ring true. It is with this in mind that it may be time to work towards as is suggested in the title remembering our humanity and forgetting the rest.

Sunday 20 May 2012

"We face neither East nor West: we face forward."

I know there are many people out there who find themselves lying awake at night wondering; how exactly did the Gold Coast become Ghana to what extent did British policy reflect the concerns of Communism, chieftancy and the Commonwealth? You may have also found yourself wondering what was the nature of the relationship between Nkrumah and Gold Coast Governor Sir Charles Arden Clarke? I was once like you until I wrote this shoddy essay, and now you can be like me and answer those questions that you have turned over and over again in your mind. 
               
Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Charles Arden-Clarke.
                    In this essay the British approaches to the various issues that arose in the Gold Coast in the lead up to it becoming Ghana in 1957 will be discussed. This discussion will be focussed on the efforts, achievements and compromises of the two men that dominated political life in the Gold Coast before independence; Kwame Nkrumah, the head of the Convention People’s Party and first Prime Minister of Ghana, and Sir Charles Arden Clarke, the last Governor General of the Gold Coast. The examination of the roles these men played in the local and international issues that arose on the road towards the independence of the Gold Coast will be chiefly informed by the primary sources that are available in the British Documents on the End of Empire series. The two volumes of this series on Ghana were edited by Richard Rathbone who has written extensively on Gold Coast politics, which will provide a valuable secondary literature on the issues that arose before independence. In discussing this topic it is necessary to first establish where the importance of Gold Coast lay for the British and what role they had in mind for Ghana in the development of global politics after the Second World War.
                       British concerns with regard to the importance of Gold Coast were reflected by much of the West at this time, the concern lay chiefly with maintaining friendly relationships with smaller nations to ensure that they remained outside of Soviet ‘spheres of influence’. Sir Richard Acland (Liberal MP; Labour MP from 1945; one of the principle founders of the Common Wealth Party) elucidated on these fears and aims in relation to the Gold Coast stating that “We believe that in one form or another the dominant world fact for at least the next quarter of a century is bound to be the contest between Freedom and Totalitarianism, between Democrats and Communists” adding that “Against this background the importance of the Gold Coast almost states itself without argument”.[1] Given the fact that the Gold Coast was the country most likely to be the first of the African nations to attain independence British attitudes towards it lay not in concerns of its strategic or economic importance. The importance the British attached to the Gold Coast was reflective of the weight attached at this time to the ‘Domino Theory’, which intimated that any country lost to Communism would adversely impact neighbouring nations and push them towards Communism as well. As the Gold Coast was going to lay the foundation for West Africa, and possibly other areas of Africa, as the first nation to attain independence its importance was in the direction it took after independence. Sir Charles Arden Clarke affirmed this point of view after the Gold Coast had become independent stating that “Ghana is a small country, with a population under five million and of no particular strategic importance; it is under-developed and its economy is mainly dependent on one crop-cocoa. Nevertheless it is very important just now because it is the spearhead of emergent Africa, politically and constitutionally”.[2] It was in this context that the importance of the Gold Coast lay and was for this reason that the British were eager that Ghana should remain within the Commonwealth. As noted by Mr. A. Mackintosh (Private Secretary to Jim Griffiths’ Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Attlee Government from February 1950), “It must be our aim on the one hand to keep on good terms with Gold Coast political leaders so that when the time comes the Gold Coast will elect voluntarily to remain within the Commonwealth”[3]. Political life on the African side in the Gold Coast was dominated by one party the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and in many ways one man; the leader of the CPP Kwame Nkrumah. However, the British relationship with Nkrumah was not always a friendly one. As the era of movement towards independence progressed there was a fundamental shift in the way the British dealt with Nkrumah and indeed how Nkrumah operated politically also. It is to this relationship that we will now turn, examining the British concerns about Nkrumah and the eventual partnership that emerged between Britain and the CPP.
                       In June of 1949 Kwame Nkrumah broke from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) of J.B. Danquah and founded the CPP. Nkrumah viewed the UGCC as being merely representative of the merchant and lawyer class of the country and setup the CPP as he “realised that this movement was doomed to failure because it ignored the interests of the masses”.[4] The CPP overshadowed Danquah’s UGCC as the voice of Gold Coast nationalism throughout the 1950s running on the platform of ‘self-government now’ replacing the UGCC slogan of ‘self-government in the shortest possible time’.[5] The strategy employed by the CPP and advocated by Nkrumah was the main source of political animosity between him and the British administration; that was ‘positive action’. The “weapons of Positive Action” as explained by Nkrumah were “1- Legitimate political action, 2- Newspapers and educational campaigns, and 3- as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence….”.[6] While Nkrumah viewed his action as legitimate and constitutional given its peaceful character, this was a view that was wholly rejected by the British administration. Arthur Creech Jones (Secretary of State for the Colonies from in the Attlee Government from October 1946) made the position of the government clear and it is necessary here to quote him at length;
“…it has for some time been the publicly announced programme of the CPP to secure its aims by the threat of ‘positive action’, consisting of nationwide strikes, boycotts, etc. designed to bring the administration and the economic life of the country to a standstill. While it is claimed to be ‘constitutional’ and ‘non-violent’, a programme of political strikes directed at the Government is in fact unconstitutional and illegal and was repeatedly declared to be so by the Gold Coast Government who warned Nkrumah personally that political strikes directed against the government were illegal and were bound, under African conditions, to lead to violence and disorder, and that he would be held responsible for the consequences.”[7]

As a result of ‘positive action’, which led to widespread disturbances in the Gold Coast in 1950, Nkrumah was imprisoned by the British, and was seen at this point as representing a dangerous and extreme new trend in the politics of the Gold Coast. The British also raised concerns about his perceived Communist sympathies. While the Foreign Office recognised that “Dr. Danquah, the leader of the United Gold Coast Convention… resents any imputation of Communist connection [sic] or sympathy” they believed that “Kwame Nkrumah … the head of the extreme nationalist Convention People’s Party, and former member of the British Communist Party, is a much more dangerous character”.[8] This difficult relationship between the British and the newly-formed CPP was fundamentally altered by the 1951 election in which they won a famous victory.[9] Before the election the British approach did seek to limit the influence of Nkrumah and the CPP. This is reflected by the musings to Sir Charles Arden Clarke of A.B. Cohen (Assistant Under-Secretary of State responsible for the Africa Division of the Colonial Office); to Arden Clarke he enquired “Is the fact that he [Nkrumah] is in prison likely to improve the chances of the CPP winning more seats in the Legislature?” adding “when Nkrumah does come out of prison is it likely to be better for the working of the new Constitution that he should be inside the Legislature…?”[10] After the election the British radically shifted their attitude towards Nkrumah and the CPP. Given the fact that they proved far more receptive partners in government than had previously been supposed the British went so far as to seek to boost the esteem with which Nkrumah and his party colleagues were regarded. The transition from imprisoning Nkrumah and other prominent members of the CPP was remarkably quick, yet it was obvious to the British that Nkrumah was in fact someone with whom they could organise the business of government, and prepare the Gold Coast for independence. This became apparent given the CPP’s early performances in the Legislature following the election. Commenting on this surprising moderation of CPP policies Arden Clark stated in a return letter to Cohen written after the election that; “Indeed the record of the CPP majority in the Assembly is somewhat remarkable. They have adopted as a working basis, without any significant amendment, the budget which they did not prepare and which contained features they did not like; they decisively defeated a motion which was popularly interpreted as advocating ‘self-government now.’”[11] Another reason why the British sought to conduct the business of government with Nkrumah was the fact that after the election there was no alternative to the CPP that could form a majority government within the Legislature. A fear presided in this situation that any alternative to the CPP that could form a government would be more extreme in its tendencies, and made it necessary for the British to build the esteem of the CPP. This fear was expressed Arden Clarke; “The dominant feature of the present situation is the fact that there is no alternative to a Government in which the CPP holds the majority. If this Government were to fall … it can only be replaced by a Government of similar complexion or of even more extreme nationalist tendencies” adding that “It has, therefore, been necessary for me to take every justifiable measure to bolster up the prestige of Nkrumah and his colleagues.”[12] It was this concern coupled with the more moderate tendencies of the CPP once they had received the opportunity to form a government that was the main stimulus of the shift in British attitudes towards Nkrumah and the CPP. Although the British did enjoy the moderation of CPP policies they had to make some concessions given the fact that the platform on which they had formed a government was ‘self-government now’. Indeed the CPP had specified in their election manifesto “… that Self-Government is the only solution to the evils that plague us, and therefore must be fought for and won now….”[13] While the British did perceive this shift as being forced upon them they remained consummately aware of what the potential alternatives were. On this point Jim Griffiths’ Private Secretary Mr. A. Mackintosh points out that “We may be forced, if we are to keep on good terms with more responsible political leaders such as Mr. Nkrumah and his immediate colleagues and not force the Gold Coast Government into the hands of extremists, to move more rapidly than ideally we should wish.”[14] It was for this reason that on the 20th February 1951 Nkrumah was declared the Leader of Government Business in essence the de facto Prime Minister.[15] This was a point that Arden Clarke elucidated on and it is necessary here to quote him at length;
“Although every opportunity has been taken to inspire the leaders of the Party with confidence that they can work the present constitution, they remain exposed to continuous attacks on the score that they are not fulfilling their primary undertaking to procure ‘self-government now’ – an undertaking to which they owe their position in Government today. I do not know for how long they can or will wish to withstand this pressure but we must be prepared for moves for further constitutional advance in the not too distant future. Ministers have already given evidence, during informal talks with me, of the desire to see immediate steps taken to build up Nkrumah into a Prime Minister de facto.[16]

This willingness on the part of the British administration to speed up the processes of turning over more responsibilities of governance to the CPP, as mentioned above, was in large part owing to the awareness that an alternative to them could constitute coping with extremists within the Gold Coast. This fed into the British and indeed the Western fear of Communist infiltration, which will be the next issue we shall discuss in this essay.
                       While the British were making significant concessions to the CPP, recognising both the nature of their political base and prospective alternatives, Nkrumah too proved eager to seek approval from the British for his political programme. In October 1953 Nkrumah suspended from the CPP Anthony Woode  and E.C. Turcson-Ocran for association with the “international Communist labour [sic] front”; the World Federation of Trade Unions.[17] Nkrumah took these actions as well as imposing other limitations on the movements in and out of the country of Communist literature and people suspected of Communist affiliation or sympathies, in order to placate the fears of the British government that Communism might infiltrate the Gold Coast. Under the Conservative Governments of Churchill and then Eden this fear appears to have become more overt as Arden Clarke received despatches urging him to ensure that all possible measures were being taken to combat potential Soviet infiltration of the Gold Coast. It appeared to the Conservative Government that the moves Nkrumah was taking were not radical enough and an element of suspicion still surrounded him. In one such despatch from W.L. Gorell Barnes (Assistant Under-Secretary of State Responsible for the Africa Division in the Churchill Government from 1952) expresses concerns regarding; “reports reaching us, including the LIC (Local Intelligence Committee) Notes, which give the impression the Communist activity in the Gold Coast had earlier seemed slight is increasing in amount and effectiveness”. Barnes further expresses concern regarding the CPP itself adding that; “Ever since the CPP took office some senior members of the Party have maintained old Communist contacts or have flirted with Communism. Nkrumah has regularly turned to the Trotskyite Padmore for advice.”[18] The concern expressed here by Barnes still originated from the belief that; “It would be a great disaster if the first British African territory to approach self-government fell increasingly under Communist Domination.”[19] The pessimism of the Government in London was not shared by those on the ground in the Gold Coast such as Arden Clarke. In response to Barnes’ concerns about the Gold Coast and the CPP Arden Clarke took a significantly different view replying that; “Nkrumah and other ministers are becoming increasingly, if gradually, aware of the dangers attendant on Communist infiltration and of the importance of building up confidence in the Gold Coast in the non-Communist world”. Arden Clarke elucidated on his position of relative optimism, which is again worth quoting at length;
“I do not wish to give the impression that the Communist threat is being underrated. But any consideration of Communism in the Gold Coast must take account of the West African character. The sophisticated African’s first loyalty is to himself and his prestige. Loyalty towards an abstract ideology is an extremely rare thing, and I do not think that Communism can be regarded at present as a significant political factor.”[20]

In spite of Arden Clarke’s input on the issue of Communism in the Gold Coast, his views were rejected and the need to prevent any prospective Communist influence was reaffirmed to him, this time by Sir Thomas Lloyd (Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office from 1947). Lloyd warned Arden Clarke that while; “It may be politically easier to wait a year or so, or even longer, before taking positive steps, but from the Secretary of State’s point of view this is hardly likely to give him the assurance he requires that Ministers not only understand the dangers but are prepared to act.”[21] As time progressed Arden Clarke became more in line with London in relation to Communism in the Gold Coast, and while his views may not have shifted in relation to the possibility of a ‘home-grown’ Communist movement, he did echo the views of many in London and the West with regard to the potential for the growth of the influence of the Soviet Union in the affairs of the Gold Coast. On this issue Arden Clarke stated that; “A main danger lies in the possibility of efforts by the Soviet Union to undermine internal stability and Western interests. Although West Africa is a far cry from the Middle East or the Sudan, it seems not only possible but probable that an attempt will be made to penetrate the Gold Coast by economic means.” Arden Clarke then goes on to assert that; “If the United Kingdom is to maintain its commercial position here, everything possible must be done to increase the confidence of Ministers of commercial, transportation and other concerns.”[22] While global issues, such as the threat of Communism, played an important role in the British approach to administration and decolonisation in the Gold Coast, internal issues played as much a role in British thinking as did global ones. It is to these issues that we will now turn in examining the conflict that arose between the CPP, Nkrumah and the traditional forms of power that existed in the Gold Coast; the chiefs.
                       The election of 1951 consolidated the reduction in power of chieftaincy throughout the Gold Coast, a move that had been gathering pace for over a decade. Chieftaincy was dependent for its influence on a receding colonial administration, which was set on massively reforming local government and a new political party, which was hostile in increasing measure to chieftaincy.[23] In a relatively short time chiefs found that they were no longer powerful, indispensable figures and were pushed into an increasingly marginal position.[24] In the cabinet formed after the 1951 election the Ashanti and the Northern Territories were forced to accept only two of eleven portfolios of the cabinet (having previously demanded four), a cabinet in which the CPP held six of the eleven portfolios. The chiefs had attempted to form a shadow government but were reminded by Arden Clarke that they were not a political party, and that in doing so they would be committing political suicide.[25] That the CPP were hostile to the idea of giving power to chieftaincy was understood by the British, it was similarly understood by the British that the chiefs were distinctly displeased with this situation. Not long after the election of 1951 Arden Clarke stated that; “The chiefs are becoming ill at ease in an Assembly where they are accorded none of the traditional respect which has been paid them in the past; at the same time they are being attacked in the rear in their own States”. He elaborates on these attacks informing us that; “In each case the inspiration has come from supporters of the CPP and although the Party officially denies that its engaged in subversive activities against the Chiefs, there is little doubt that it would be glad to see the departure from public life of the more able and experienced Chiefs who do not subscribe to the Party’s claim to political leadership.” Arden Clarke also points out on this issue another underlying cause of the animosity between the chiefs and the CPP, he states that; “It must be remembered that the CPP is the Party of the young men, who in the past have been suppressed and denied any part in the management of their State affairs.” He adds that; “They are now reacting with some turbulence and the agitation against the Chiefs is a symptom of their impatience for reform, coupled with their desire to pay off old scores.” [26] As a result of the acrimonious relationship between the CPP and the chiefs a number of de-stoolments of chiefs took place, and while some were the result of variations in readings of ‘tradition’ others had national political overtones.[27] Concerns raised about the number of these de-stoolments were addressed in Parliament and was explained in the following terms;
“This movement against the Chiefs apparently derives from the part played by the Chiefs in the General Election and the desire of the CPP for political vengeance; it does not appear, however, to be centrally inspired. Dr. Nkrumah is believed to have discouraged overt intervention by the CPP although local members of the CPP have taken a prominent role in de-stoolment. It appears rather to have been caused by a surge of genuine popular feeling against the political role played by the Chiefs in the central and Local Government, a result of the young men who are now aware of their power.”[28]
As time progressed this gulf between chieftaincy and the central authority of the government widened. The Ashanti sought special treatment for their region, a move that was rejected by the British. The efforts of the Ashanti and the chiefs in the North to reassert their political power were consistently and continuously met with negative responses from the British and the CPP. As a result of this and the sweeping return to power of the CPP in the elections (albeit with a slightly reduced majority) 1954 saw the foundation of the National Liberation Movement (NLM); this would provide a unified opposition to CPP dominance.[29] While the British at times showed sympathy in increasing the influence of regional concerns in national politics they always stopped short of devolution and federalisation, the latter being the primary aim of the NLM. On this issue Arden Clarke provides us with insight into the reasoning behind the rejection of the Asanteman Council’s appeal for federal constitution in late 1954. Of this he says;
The Asanteman Council’s resolution is a sign, but no more than a sign, that the country will not accept unqualified dictation from the centre and, as such, it is a healthy manifestation of the feelings of a considerable proportion of the population. The resolution, however, is misguided in that it urges a solution which is not practicable. While, therefore, I shall continue to work for the recognition of regional interests by the Government and for freer consultation between the Government and regional bodies, I cannot support the resolution.”[30]

The conflict between the CPP and the chiefs remained until after the British had declared the independence of Ghana. The NLM and Nkrumah were irreconcilable as the NLM wanted to settle for nothing less than a federal constitution. The fundamentals of this divergence of the local and the national, and the subsequent assaults on the power of Nkrumah by the NLM were recognised by the British as follows; “The attack on Dr. Nkrumah’s powers as Prime Minister derives partly from the deep distrust of him felt in the NLM and in part from the fear that a strong Central Government in the Gold Coast must inevitably continue to take away from chiefs (among whom the Asantehene is pre-eminent) and other traditional authorities most of their power and dignity”[31] Nkrumah’s view of this conflict between chieftaincy and centralism was of a much more ‘cut and dry’ nature. For Nkrumah;
“The past year has not been an easy time for any of us but at the same time I do appreciate that when we travel at the speed we have done over the last four or five years, it is difficult to expect everyone to be able to adjust his mind and customs with equal rapidity. This is especially so when the adjustment entails a jump from old age feudalism to twentieth century democracy.”[32]
 
Neither the British nor Nkrumah were willing to meet the demands of the NLM, nor were the fundamental issues involved resolved before independence. The NLM advanced as a political force and contested the 1956 general election. This election in many ways can be seen as the last act of politics in the Gold Coast, before it became Ghana in March 1957. The remaining months of direct British involvement was dedicated to winding down the business of Empire in the Gold Coast. In many ways, while the face of politics in the Gold Coast had shifted immensely from the foundation of the CPP to the foundation of the NLM, there was still a great deal of continuity. This was reflected in the results of the 1956 election and the continuing dominance of the CPP; taking 71 of 104 seats, which cleared the way for independence eight months later. The reasonable majority the British requested as a prerequisite for the grant of independence had been met.[33]
                       The British approach to decolonisation in the Gold Coast was coloured by an array of different concerns. The country was of immense importance in that it would be seen as providing the template for those countries that were also on the road to independence in West Africa and throughout Africa as a whole. Dominating the whole era from the foundation of the ubiquitous CPP to independence was the relationship between Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Charles Arden Clarke. Nkrumah described this relationship as; “beginning with doubts, suspicions and misunderstandings, then acknowledging the growth of trust, sincerity and friendship.”[34] Arden Clarke told R.J. Vile (Assistant Secretary Head of West Africa Department ‘B’ from 1954) in early 1956 that “their [Arden Clarke and Nkrumah] personal friendship was as deep as ever.”[35] It would have been tremendously difficult to envisage how this friendship could have developed between these two men as things stood in 1949. However, both Nkrumah and Arden Clarke and the politics they represented underwent significant shifts in a respectful recognition of their respective positions. There were great difficulties that needed to be overcome before independence could become a political reality in the Gold Coast. Primary amongst all of these in the planning of British governments was the threat that Communism presented to those nations of the world that had either an active nationalist movement or were newly independent. In the realities of the post World War II world there was no nation, regardless of how strategically insignificant it was regarded as being, that could escape from the divisions developing throughout the globe in the fight between ‘Freedom’ and ‘Totalitarianism’ that was the Cold War. There were however significant local issues as well as global ones. These manifested themselves in the form of conflict between the ‘traditional’ seats of power in the Gold Coast; the chiefs, and the new centralised government situated in Accra. While the British were unable to assist the CPP or the chiefs in attaining closure on this issue, they withdrew on the basis that the CPP provided sufficient stability to make the transition to independence. British thinking on these issues was not always uniform travelling between London and the Gold Coast, and the approaches they took in steering the Gold Coast towards independence were often made out of the consideration of making sure that the first African nation that would attain self-government would do so in a stable manner, while maintaining its links to its former master.


B I B L I O G R A P H Y
- Arden Clarke, Charles, ‘Gold Coast into Ghana: Some Problems of Transition’, in International Affairs 34, No. 1 (1958), 49-56

- Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, (London, 1964)

- Howell, Thomas A. and Rajasooria, Jeffrey P., (eds.), Ghana and Nkrumah, (New York, 1972)

- Metcalfe, G.E., (ed.), Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History 1807-1957, (London, 1964)

- Nkrumah, Kwame, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (London, 1957)

- Rathbone, Richard, (ed.), British Documents and the End of Empire: Ghana Volumes 1 & 2, (London, 1992)

- Rathbone, Richard, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, (Oxford, 2000)

- Twumasi, Yaw, ‘J. B. Danquah: Towards an Understanding of the Social and Political Ideas of a Ghanaian Nationalist and Politician’, in African Affairs 77, No. 306 (1978), 73-88


[1] ‘The Economic Position of the Gold Coast: Memorandum Submitted by Sir. R. Acland to Mr Griffiths’ 16th April 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana, Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 307 – Mr. Griffiths is Jim Griffiths Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Attlee Government from February 1950.
[2] Sir Charles Arden Clarke, ‘Gold Coast into Ghana: Some Problems of Transition’, in International Affairs 34, No. 1 (1958): 49
[3] ‘Minutes by Sir T. Lloyd, L.H. Gorusch and A.B. Cohen on Mr. Nkrumah’s Possible Requests During His Forthcoming Visit to London’ 23rd May-11th June 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana, Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 329
[4] Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (London, 1957), viii
[5] Yaw Twumasi, ‘J. B. Danquah: Towards an Understanding of the Social and Political Ideas of a Ghanaian Nationalist and Politician’, in African Affairs 77, No. 306 (1978): 76
[6] Kwame Nkrumah, ‘What I Mean by Positive Action’, in Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957, edited by G.E. Metcalfe, (London, 1964), 689
[7] ‘Letter from Mr. Creech Jones to Sir V. Tewson on the General Strike Arising from the CPP Campaign of Positive Action’ 31st January 1950, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 241
[8] ‘A Survey of communism in Africa: Foreign Office Research Department Memorandum, Part Two: Regional Survey- British West Africa’, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 273
[9] Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960, (London, 1964), 103
[10] ‘Letter from A.B. Cohen to Sir Charles Arden Clarke on the Question of Releasing Mr. Nkrumah from Prison’ 23rd December 1950, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 281
[11] ‘Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to A.B. Cohen on the Prospect of Agitation for Further Constitutional Change’ 12th May 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 323
[12] ‘Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to A.B. Cohen on the Prospect of Agitation for Further Constitutional Change’ 12th May 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 323-324
[13] ‘Convention People’s Party, General Election Manifesto 1951’, in Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957, edited by G.E. Metcalfe, (London, 1964), 704
[14] ‘Minutes by Sir T. Lloyd, L.H. Gorusch and A.B. Cohen on Mr. Nkrumah’s Possible Requests During His Forthcoming Visit to London’ 23rd May-11th June 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana, Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 329
[15] Austin, Politics in Ghana, 154
[16] ‘Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to A.B. Cohen on the Prospect of Agitation for Further Constitutional Change’ 12th May 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 324
[17]Thomas A. Howell and Jeffrey P. Rajasooria (eds.), Ghana and Nkrumah, (New York, 1972), 19
[18] ‘Letter from W.L. Gorell Barnes to Sir Charles Arden Clarke on Intelligence Reports of Communist Infiltration of the Trades Union Movement’ 26th June 1953, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 57-58 –The Padmore referred to here is George Padmore long-time friend of Nkrumah’s, as well as a fellow Pan-Africanist. 
[19] ‘Letter from W.L. Gorell Barnes to Sir Charles Arden Clarke on Intelligence Reports of Communist Infiltration of the Trades Union Movement’ 26th June 1953, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 59
[20] ‘Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to W.L. Gorell Barnes on Communist Influence Within the Trade Unions Movement’ 4th December 1953, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 78
[21] ‘Letter from Sir Thomas Lloyd to Sir Charles Arden Clarke on the Measures Needed to Prevent the Expansion of Communist Influence’ 4th January 1954, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 79
[22] ‘Despatch No. 20 from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to Mr. Lennox-Boyd  on the Danger of Soviet Economic Penetration in the Gold Coast and the Counter-action Needed’ 14th July 1955, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 279 – Alan Lennox-Boyd was then Secretary of State in the Colonial Office.
[23] Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951-1960, (Oxford, 2000), 29
[24] Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 28
[25] Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 29-30
[26] ‘Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to A.B. Cohen on the Prospect of Agitation for Further Constitutional Change’ 12th May 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 323
[27] Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 36
[28] ‘Minute by E.G.G. Harnott on a Parliamentary Question About the Number of De-stoolments Since the CPP Took Office’ 19th June 1951, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 1, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 337
[29] Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 64-65
[30] ‘Despatch No. 931 from Sir Charles Arden Clarke to Mr. Lennox Boyd on the Asanteman Council’s Resolution in Favour of a Federal Constitution’ 18th November 1954, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 99-100
[31] ‘Outward Circular Intelligence Telegram No. 164 from Foreign Office Diplomatic Posts on the Constitutional Crisis’ 10th September 1955, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 169 –The Asantehene is the Leader of the Ashanti People.
[32] ‘Letter from Dr. Nkrumah to Mr. Lennox-Boys on the Adjustment from Age Old Feudalism to Twentieth Century Democracy’ 21st November 1955, in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 201
[33] Austin, Politics is Ghana, 353
[34] Nkrumah, Autobiography, 282
[35] ‘Note by R.J. Vile of his Discussion with Sir Charles Arden Clarke on a General Election and the Governor’s Relations with Dr. Nkrumah’ 10th February 1956, in in British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana Volume 2, edited by Richard Rathbone, (London, 1992), 234 

Monday 14 May 2012

"Attention Conscious Documentary Addicts"

If you are in any way like me then you will have trawled the internet for many an hour looking for a particularly good array of documentary films. I am here not referring to the endless streams crud about how aliens are responsible for all human progress, or how the world is coming to an end this year because the calendar of a long expired ancient civilisation says so. Regardless of how entertaining these sometimes are for comic relief, they often appear when you are seeking enlightenment about the issues that are confronting our species in the real world. Well, seek no more weary travellers, the oasis of thought provoking, stimulating and ultimately informative documentary films you see before you is no mirage.

Films For Action (NOT A MIRAGE)

Films for Action Facebook Page

This site of provides an excellent and broad variety of docs; all carefully selected with a view "to raise awareness of important social, environmental, and media-related issues not covered by the mainstream news". Helpfully divided by subject Films for Action boasts videos made by and about some of the finest thinkers of our age, of whom, for me at least, Adam Curtis, Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn stand out. Not only does this site play host to a glittering array of renowned thinkers but the issues about which one can learn relate to the greatest and most pressing concerns and issues confronting humanity. These range from indigenous issues, human rights, democracy, climate change, philosophy, food, technology, terrorism and many others. The stated aim of Films for Action is "to provide citizens with the information and perspectives essential to creating a more just, sustainable, and democratic society". Given the extent to which politicians seem daily further and further removed from the financial and social realities of a majority of the population upon whom they have imposed themselves, the goal is a worthwhile one indeed. So as a final word, I will sign off by saying that Films for Action goes above and beyond much of what currently resides out there in internetland, providing a conscious and praiseworthy alternative to many other doc sites for the more discerning prospective or active radical. AND I PROMISE: NO ANCIENT ALIENS!

Tuesday 1 May 2012

"MALAISE FOREVER...."


Here is the essay I just submitted for my course on the Image of America. So Jimmy, can government be competent?


IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JIMMY CARTER

In this essay the realities of President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy and its human rights agenda will be assessed against the backdrop of the rhetoric that surrounded it. Upon assuming the office of President, Carter set out in no uncertain terms that his approach to foreign policy would mark an immense sea change in the way the United States conducted itself on the global scene. In his inaugural address Carter explicitly linked the long established freedoms of American society to how the United States should conduct itself in international affairs stating that; “we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation” adding that “[w]e will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to our strength.”[1] Here, Carter was explicitly linking the internal freedoms of American society to its external behaviour, something that no President had sought to do since the Cold War began. He believed that America had a special purpose and position in spreading the message of human rights throughout the world noting that; “No other country is as well qualified as we to set an example.”[2] Similarly Carter sought to establish a link to his human rights policy to the foundation of America stating that; “This policy [Human Rights Policy] has produced some controversy, but it’s very much in keeping with the character and the history of our own nation. We became an independent nation in a struggle for human rights.”[3]
              In asserting the new morality of United States foreign policy Carter frequently referenced the damaging effect that Vietnam, Watergate as well as the revelations of the Church Committee had on public perceptions of government. In 1978 Carter remarked on this loss of confidence saying that; “Another thing I learned when I was campaigning around our Nation was that as a result of the Vietnam War, as a result of Watergate, as a result of mistakes made and revealed in the CIA, that there had been a loss of respect and a sense of partnership between the American people and our government.”[4] In order to combat this ‘loss of respect’ Carter sought to restore an image of America of which Americans could again be proud, by setting “…American Foreign Policy on a new course consistent with the values and highest ideals of the American People.”[5] Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski noted something similar in his memoirs recalling the fact that; “After and almost unending series of revelations about the abuse of governmental power at home and abroad, the American people were dissatisfied with their government.”[6] Carter was of the opinion that an ethical underpinning to American foreign affairs could restore the American people’s image of America and themselves as honest, decent and morally courageous. Furthermore, he felt it could re-establish America’s role as an example to be followed and return it to its position as a shining light to the rest of the world. On this point Carter remarked that “It [Human Rights Policy] restores a kind of a beacon light of something that’s clean and decent and proper as a rallying point for us in all the democracies of the world.”[7] Before examining how Carter’s policy was approached by his administration it is first necessary to define in brief what his administration meant by human rights.
               It is necessary to discuss in the context of this essay what the Carter administration meant when discussing human rights, as it is a notion that is prone to fluctuation owing to certain people’s rhetorical or partisan positioning, or indeed their geographical or temporal positioning. Taking a view from inside the Carter White House, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance helpfully and succinctly illuminates on what he means when discussing human rights. Vance divides human rights into four levels, of which “[t]he most important… are those that protect the security of the person.” He goes on to state that; “[v]iolations of such rights include genocide; slavery; torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair trial; and invasion of the home.” Vance further defines certain secondary rights as “that bundle of rights affecting the fulfilment [sic] of such vital needs as food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education.” The third set of right Vance defines are; “the right to enjoy civil and political liberties. These include not only freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom to assemble and to petition the government to redress grievances” as well as “the freedom to move freely within and to and from one's own country.” Lastly, Vance adds, “there is a basic human right to freedom from discrimination because of race, religion, colour, [sic] or gender.”[8] . It is this standard of human rights as defined here by Vance that will be applied in this essay. Taking Vance’s definitions of human rights to what extent then did Carter achieve this renewed vision of a morally centred foreign policy? It is to this question that we shall now turn, as well as assessing to what extent Carter’s vision of expanding American ideals to the world was successful in the context of the often volatile and changeable geopolitical realities of the Cold War.
                The first example we shall examine here is Carter’s approach to the nations of Asia. We shall begin by looking at the country Henry Kissinger had identified during the Ford administration as “the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state”[9]; Indonesia. In his memoirs, Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, expresses satisfaction with the discernible fruits that were yielded in Indonesia as a result of the new focus on human rights in American foreign policy. Brzezinski states that; “In Southeast Asia the improvement in human rights conditions was most notable in Indonesia” owing to the fact that “[o]ver a period of eight months in 1977-78 the government released 15,000 political prisoners and completed the release of the remaining 20,000 over the next two years.”[10] In spite of the successes that the United States had in Indonesia in relation to the release of prisoners within the country, the approach taken to Indonesia’s behaviour externally was drastically different.
                Though Carter is frequently referred to as the first post-Cold War president[11], the considerations of his administration in relation to Indonesian actions towards East Timor were heavily Cold War related[12]. On the question of East Timor, which was described by Daniel Patrick Moynihan as “a place of no great importance”[13], Carter’s human rights approach to foreign policy was of secondary importance owing to the considerations of Indonesia’s value as a Cold War ally. Mike Armacost* stressed this importance to Brzezinski in a memorandum for Carter, noting that; “Our stake in close ties with Indonesia derives from its large size and population, strategic location, potential for leadership within Southeast Asia…and its abundant energy and other natural resources.”[14] As a direct result of Indonesia’s perceived importance within the Carter White House the human rights agenda in foreign policy was not only side-lined but on the issue of East Timor was actively subverted. Armacost recommended to Brzezinski that the United States Government should; “[e]ase up on the human rights pressures directed at Indonesia” as well as stating that “we should seek to persuade Congressman FraserÑ to cease hearings on the Timor question.”[15] Similarly documents that Congressman Fraser requested regarding Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger’s advanced knowledge of Indonesia’s plans for east Timor were withheld by Brzezinski on the grounds that; “It would create a very damaging precedent in terms of preserving the confidentiality surrounding Presidential meetings with foreign leaders that is essential to any orderly process of foreign policy-making.”[16]
              The Carter administration, as well as seeking to subvert any public knowledge of the gross human rights violations that took place in East Timor at the hands of the Indonesian military, provided crucial material aid to the process of the annexation. Carter in fact stepped up arms transfers to the Indonesian military in 1977 and 1978, when arguably atrocities against the Timorese were at their worst. The Carter White House approved the biggest arms transfers and sales to Indonesia in 1978 totalling 127 million dollars, the second largest arms transfer approved between 1975 and 1995.[17] It is apparent then, that Carter’s human rights policy failed in East Timor. While his administration sought to make human rights the cornerstone of foreign policy, in relation to the Timorese this policy was side-lined for the concerns of an ally that was too important to sacrifice during the Cold War. This episode displays that there were times when the strategic concerns of the United States were too important to ignore at the expense of moral consistency, and the image of ethical American foreign policy Carter referred to in public did not match the background realities of Cold War diplomatic discussion. Another instance where these issues again became prominent in the crucial strategic region of Southeast Asia was in Cambodia. It is to that example that we shall now turn.
                It was in large part during the Carter administration that one of the most infamous genocides of the modern age took place in Cambodia. It appeared at first as if the United States was preparing to take a more aggressive stand against Cambodia than it had with regard to Indonesia and East Timor, speaking out in strong terms against the abuses that were taking place there. In April 1978 Carter pronounced that; “America cannot avoid the responsibility to speak out in condemnation of the Cambodian Government, the worst violator of human rights in the world today” going on to conclude that “[i]t is an obligation of every member of the international community to protest the policies of this or any nation which cruelly and systematically violates the rights of its people to enjoy life and basic human dignities.”[18] Carter, however, would face similar difficulties with Cambodia as it did with Indonesia and East Timor i.e. the potential to alienate a prospective and powerful strategic ally. This time that prospective ally was the People’s Republic of China. This emerged as the reality, owing itself to the fact that the Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge was supported by the Chinese Government, with whom Carter wanted to develop a new relationship.[19] The concern for human rights in Cambodia would have to be tempered if there was to be, as was desired, a new and normalised relationship with the Chinese government.
                  It was for this reason that the Carter administration was severely critical of the incursions by Vietnamese troops into Cambodia in late 1978, which sought to oust the Pol Pot regime, but somewhat less vocal on Chinese incursion into Vietnam, conducted with the view of maintaining the same regime. Though Carter was at this time seeking to normalise relations with both Vietnam and China the relationship with China took primacy.[20] What this meant for Carter’s policy towards Cambodia was that they provided food aid to the Cambodian government as well as voting alongside China in the United Nations to seat the Khmer Rouge. The humanitarian aid the Khmer Rouge received was certainly invaluable to their survival and their ability to protract the genocidal policies of their hideous regime.[21] The Carter White House was again forced to distance itself from consistency on its human rights stance giving into the reality that China was a more valuable partner than Vietnam. Carter’s policy towards Cambodia, as it had been in relation to Indonesia, centred more on geopolitical concerns than it did on human rights.[22] Though it was recognised that the Khmer Rouge was ‘the worst violator of human rights in the world’ the normalisation of relations with China took primacy over assertive action in opposition to them. This resulted in them giving tacit approval to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam,[23] and in calling for a withdrawal from both sides reaffirmed that there was “no bilateral disharmony between ourselves and the Chinese”[24]. Although Carter sought to halt the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia and bolster the Khmer Rouge, with the view of strengthening ties with China, it is apparent that without Vietnamese intervention the Pol Pot regime might have continued its maniacal tyranny in Cambodia. Speaking on this possibility, albeit in retrospect, Norodom Sihanouk opined that; “If they [Vietnam] had not ousted Pol Pot, everyone would have died –not only me, but everyone- they would have killed us all.”[25] In the case of Cambodia Carter’s human rights concerns had to be set aside in favour of strengthening strategic and geopolitical concerns. Moving away from events in Asia, we will next examine how Carter’s foreign policy aims were carried out in the Middle East, looking specifically at Iran.
                 In his memoirs Zbigniew Brzezinski states that “Iran was the Carter administration’s greatest setback.”[26] At the beginning of Carter’s presidency the Shah of Iran was greatly concerned that his rule would be publically targeted by Carter as a specific case where there was a need for improvement on human rights. This prompted Carter in 1977 to write to the Shah in order to give him the reassurance he sought. Carter wrote to the Shah noting the “particularly close ties which have existed between our two countries since World War II are supported by a broad consensus in the United States that we share many vital mutual objectives and that it is in the interest of our country to cooperate with yours.”[27] As well as this in early 1978 Carter visited Iran in order to reaffirm support for the cornerstone of American security interests in the region.[28] On his trip Carter lauded the Shah stating that; “Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and admiration and love which your people give you.”[29] While en route back to Washington Carter was asked whether he brought up the issue of human rights in Iran and remarked; “the Shah is very deeply concerned about human rights, and I mentioned human rights in my statement in Iran.”[30] However, events would gradually deteriorate in Iran, and as the demise of the Shah’s regime gathered pace Carter would be confronted with increasingly difficult choices as to what extent he should offer the support of the United States.
                 Zbigniew Brzezinski writes extensively on the White House’s responses to the worsening crisis in Iran throughout 1978/79. He highlights the tensions in how the Shah was presented to the public, the realities of inconsistency with human rights policies, and the reasons why the maintenance of his frequently egregious regime was strategically crucial. On these points Brzezinski tells us that; “we knew that our ties with Iran would suffer if our principal regional ally was seen by the American public as flagrantly violating human rights.”[31] It was  strategic, economic and security concerns, and a disregard for human rights as a consequence, that caused the Carter White House to seek to maintain friendly relations with the Shah. Indeed the intimations of Carter that arms sales would be restricted by those countries that proved to be consistent violators of human rights did not apply in Iran. The trade continued, in spite of the knowledge of increasing human rights abuses as opposition to the Shah’s rule intensified, in the fashion of ‘business as usual’.[32] Commenting on the reasons for this Brzezinski states that; “Recognising [sic] Iran’s strategic centrality, we chose to continue that policy, [Nixon/Kissinger Arms Transfers] approving major sales of arms to Iran in the course of 1978.”[33] In the end all of this was not enough to save the Shah’s regime. Carter’s Iranian policy after his fall centred entirely on the hostage situation that emerged after supporters of the new Khomeini regime occupied the American Embassy in Tehran in response to American support for their hated former dictator.[34] In the case of Iran the Carter administration was again forced to ‘fly in the face’ of its human rights concerns in order to try and secure crucial economic and strategic concerns. We will now examine the extent to which Carter was able to apply a human rights agenda to another nation of the world that underwent significant political change during his years in the White House; Nicaragua.
                The approach of the Carter administration to Nicaragua provides some of the more glaring inconsistencies in the application of his foreign policy. Nicaragua had long been subjected to the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, though his position had been maintained as he was considered a crucial component of American interests in Latin America.[35] However, Somoza, like the Shah, would come under ever intensifying pressures to relinquish his rule during the years Jimmy Carter was in office, and as aforementioned the Carter administration responded with remarkable inconsistency in the application of policy towards Nicaragua. Example of these inconsistencies include the termination of aid in 1977 followed by 12 million dollars in military aid the following year and criticism of Somoza in 1977 in the area of human rights followed by praise the following year.[36] The administration’s concerns for Nicaragua were largely born out of a pervading trend developing in Latin America and the Caribbean at the time. Robert Pastor (National Security Adviser on Latin America and the Caribbean) expressed concern to David Aaron (Deputy National Security Adviser) and Brzezinski regarding this trend and its possible implications for the future of Nicaragua noting that El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala all had “a strong intransigent military government with little or no popular support” that were all equally opposed by “revolutionary guerrilla groups which are predominantly indigenous but maintain ties with Cuba and each other.”[37] It was owing to these concerns that as fighting intensified with Somoza’s National Guard and the Sandinista insurgency in 1978 Carter sent additional aid to Somoza.[38]
                  As the situation looked increasingly bleak for the survival of Somoza’s regime Carter somewhat naively sought to find a solution that maintained Somoza’s institutions, including his hated National Guard, but extricated Somoza himself.[39] The fundamental conflict at play with Nicaragua was between those among Carter’s staff who believed human rights should be preserved above all against those who took the view that was relevant to the developing Cold War realities.[40] It is apparent that, given Carter’s continued support for Somoza, the latter won a majority of the arguments that may have taken place on the issue. In June of 1978 Carter sent a letter of support to Somoza, in which he welcomed the dictator’s promises to restore human rights to Nicaragua. The letter was condemned from all sides and despite a subsequent scramble to downplay the letter being a show of support, significant damage had been done to perceptions of Carter’s approach to Nicaragua,[41]as the letter was naturally interpreted as a show of support for the dictator.[42] On the issue of Nicaragua the Carter administration again showed significant shortcomings in its efforts to apply with sufficient rigour or consistency a human rights agenda in its foreign policy. While seeking to maintain a regime without Somoza, but one that retained the dictatorial infrastructure, such as the National Guard, Carter’s dedication to his human rights agenda encountered significant scepticism from many quarters. Having examined some of the shortcomings in Carter’s human rights agenda in relation to Indonesia, Cambodia, Iran and Nicaragua we will now conclude by examining how these approaches to foreign policy concerns stacked up against his assertions at the beginning of his Presidency that he would actively pursue a correlation between America’s internal freedoms and its behaviour externally.
                   Although this essay has accentuated the negatives of Carter’s approaches to various situations that arose during his presidency, this was carried out with a view to examining the shortcomings of his foreign policy, and the inconsistencies that existed in an approach that had human rights as its stated foundation. On a positive note Carter significantly advanced the cause of human rights globally by his championing of new standards in the form of the Helsinki Accords, as well as making human rights part of the regular parlance of international diplomacy. As Carter stated in relation to this; “I think there are very few leaders in the world now who don’t realise that their attitude toward the basic question of human rights is a crucial element on our future relationships with them.”[43] In relation to the shortcomings in the application of these policies, some of which have been discussed here, Brzezinksi states that; “our principles were not always applied with an adequate sense of nuance and specificity. This was due partly problems inherent in fitting human rights criteria into the framework of American interests, but also partly to our own shortcomings.”[44]
                   At the outset of his administration Carter heavily linked his hopes that America’s ideals and internal freedoms would be reflected in its behaviour in the world. He frequently reaffirmed this position in public, stating in his 1978 State of the Union speech that “[t]he very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights.”[45] As well as linking foreign policy to the values of the nation Carter also appealed to the sensibilities of the American people stating that; “The effort to make human rights a central component of our foreign policy comes from our deepest sense of ourselves as a humane and freedom-loving people.”[46] In seeking to connect his foreign policy to the nation Carter referenced the foundation of the American nation saying that; “as long as I am President, at home and around the world America’s examples and America’s influence will be marshalled [sic] to advance the cause of human rights. To establish those values, two centuries ago a bold generation of Americans risked their property, their position, and life itself.”[47] The timing of Carter’s administration made it rhetorically advantageous to make such connections; the American nation having just celebrated its bicentennial. However, Carter was confronted with various crises during his time in the White House, most notably the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Commenting on the latter Carter acknowledged that his “opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the previous two-and-a half years.”[48]
              As the crises deepened in Iran and Afghanistan Carter tempered his pronouncements with a more realistic slant. Speaking on the crises that had emerged in 1979 Carter stated that; “These two crises [Afghanistan and Iran] underline the reality that our world is indeed a dangerous place, but what I want to emphasise today is that amid the crises of the moment…the fundamentals of American Foreign Policy are being carried forward with consistency, with strength and with determination” adding that “we must strive in our own foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests.”[49] Carter, however still maintained that; “America is Human Rights. That’s what America was meant to be.”[50] Brzezinski on this issue states that; “In the first two years of the Administration these global concerns tended to overshadow the pressing requirements of strategic reality. In the last two, we had to make up for lost time, giving a higher priority to the more fundamental interests of National Security.”[51] When viewed in the context of the obvious inconsistencies that emerged in his efforts to enact this foreign policy Carter’s pronouncements on the linkage between America, its traditions, freedoms and people with the human rights foundation of his foreign policy caused a fundamental question to emerge. Namely whether these values, which are considered so central to American’s image of their nation as well as the image American leadership wishes to present around the world, are consistent with foreign policy? Based on the lessons of the Carter administration it would appear that there can be little if any correlation between the internal freedoms of American society and its external behaviour, in spite of what pronouncements may come from leadership within America. While rhetorically Carter maintained there was consistency in his policy, the examples cited above as well as many others that there is no room to discuss here appear to indicate otherwise. The expansion of what are the most treasured elements of the image of America to its behaviour in international politics may be unattainable owing to the existence of more pressing strategic realities. While there can be no degree of certainty as to what extent this is true since the fall of the Soviet Union, in the context of the Cold War this was certainly the reality, as can be attested to by the people of East Timor, Iran, Indonesia, Nicaragua and many other nations. For these reasons it seems prudent to reject Jimmy Carter’s promotion of the idea he espoused when quoting the American writer and poet Archibald McLeish; “There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It’s the American Dream.”[52]

   B I B L I O G R A P H Y
-Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, (London, 1983)
- Clymer, Kenton, The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship, (London, 2004)
-  Cottam, Martha L., ‘The Carter Administration's Policy Toward Nicaragua: Images, Goals, and Tactics’, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Spring, 1992): pp.123-146
- Dumbrell, John, The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation, (Manchester, 1995)
- Fagen, Richard R., ‘The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?’, in Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978, Vol. 57, No. 3, (1978): pp.652-669
- Hurst, Steven, The Carter Administration and Vietnam, (London, 1996)
- Joshi, Manoj K., ‘The "Human Rights Phase" of American Foreign Policy’, in Social Scientist, Vol. 10, No. 6 (June, 1982): pp.38-50
- Kivimӓki, Timo Antero, ‘National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US Exercise of Power in Indonesia, 1974-1979’, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1994): pp.415-431
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, A Dangerous Place, (London, 1979)
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, On the Law of Nations, (Massachussetts, 1990)
- Muravchik, Joshua, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy, (Maryland, 1986)
-Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1977, Books 1 and 2, (Washington DC, 1977/1978) - United States Government Printing Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1978, Books 1 and 2, (Washington DC, 1979) - United States Government Printing Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1979, Books 1 and 2, (Washington DC, 1980) - United States Government Printing Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1980/1981, Books 1,2 and 3, (Washington DC, 1981/1982) - United States Government Printing Office
- Rosati, Jerel A., ‘Jimmy Carter, A Man before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post-Cold War Presidency ‘, in Presidential Studies Quarterly: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Presidencies, Vol. 23, No.3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 459-476
- Schmitz, David F., The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989, (New York, 2006)
- Schmitz, David F. and Walker, Vanessa, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, in Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, Issue 1 (January, 2004): pp.113-143
-Vance, Cyrus, ‘The Human Rights Imperative’, in Foreign Policy, No. 63 (Summer, 1986): pp.3-19

INTERNET RESOURCES
- http://www.gwu.edu/ -George Washington University
- http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ -The American Presidency Project
- http://www.worldpolicy.org/ -World Policy Institute


[1] Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 20th January 1977 – Available at the US Presidency Project http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6575#axzz1sOZdmUw0 (Accessed 15-4-2012)
[2] ‘Address at the Commencement of Exercises at the University of Notre Dame’ 22nd May 1977, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1977,  Book 1, (Washington DC, 1977/8): p.958
[3] ‘The President’s News Conference’ 15th December, 1977, in Public Papers:1977, Book 2: p.2115
[4] ‘Remarks at the Hibernian Society Dinner; Savannah, Georgia’ 17th March 1978, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1978,  Book 1, (Washington DC, 1979): p.542
[5] ‘State of the Union’ 19th January 1978, in Public Papers:1978, Book 1: p.117
[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, (London, 1983) p.124
[7] ‘Remarks and a Question and Answers Session with a Group of Publishers, Editors and Broadcasters’ May 20th 1977, in Public Papers:1977, Book 1: p.947
[8] Cyrus Vance, ‘The Human Rights Imperative’, in Foreign Policy, No. 63 (Summer, 1986): p.4
[9] Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, “East Timor Revisited” 21st November, 1975, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.62, Document 3 in David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989, (New York, 2006) p.136
[10] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.128
[11] For examples of this see Jerel A. Rosati, ‘Jimmy Carter, A Man before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post-Cold War Presidency ‘, in Presidential Studies Quarterly: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Presidencies, Vol. 23, No.3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 459-476, and Vanessa Walker and David F. Schmitz, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, in Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, Issue 1 (January, 2004): p.113-143.
[12] Timo Antero Kivimӓki, ‘National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US Exercise of Power in Indonesia, 1974-
1979’, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1994): p.428
[13] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, (London, 1979) p.246
* Armacost was selected as a member of the National Security Council to handle East Asian and Chinese affairs under the Carter administration.
[14] Memo for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Michael Armacost, "Initiatives to Deepen Relations with Indonesia”, June 14, 1977 – National Security Archive Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 4, Jimmy Carter Library –Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/1034.pdf (Accessed 15-4-2012)
Ñ Donald Fraser; Democratic Congressman for Minnesota held a number of hearings in human rights abuses in East Timor during the late 1970s’
[15] Memo for Brzezinksi from Armacost, “Initiatives to Deepen Relations with Indonesia”, June 14, 1977
[16] Memo from Michael Armacost to David Aaron and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Request from Don Fraser for MemCon on President Ford Meeting with President Suharto," July 6, 1977 - Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive – Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/878.pdf (Accessed 15-4-2012)
[17] William D. Hartung, ‘U.S. Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997: Who's Influencing Whom?’, in World Policy Journal, (March, 1997) – Available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indoarms.html#financing (Accessed 16-4-2012)
[18] ‘Statement by the President on Human Rights Violations in Cambodia’, 21st April, 1978, in Public Papers:1978, Book 1: p.768   
[19] Kenton Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship, (London, 2004) p.119
[20] Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam, (London, 1996) p.106
[21] Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, p135
[22] Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 113-114
[23] Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 119-120
[24] ‘The President’s News Conference’ 27th February, 1979, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1979,  Book 1, (Washington DC, 1980): p.348
[25] Chicago Tribune, 29th August, 1995, in Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, p.119
[26] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.354
[27] ‘Carter to the Shah of Iran’, 7th February, 1977, White House Central File: Country Files, Box CO-31, Jimmy Carter Library, in Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, p.173
[28] Manoj K. Joshi, ‘The "Human Rights Phase" of American Foreign Policy’, in Social Scientist, Vol. 10, No. 6 (June, 1982): p.47
[29] ‘Tehran, Iran’, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2nd January, 1978, p.1975 in Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy, (Maryland, 1986) p. 141
[30] ‘Questions and Answer Session with Reporters on Board Air Force One En Route to the United States’, January 6th, 1978 in Public Papers: 1978,  Book 1, (Washington DC, 1979): p. 47
[31] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 357
[32] Joshi, ‘The "Human Rights Phase" of American Foreign Policy’, p.48
[33] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 357
[34] John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation, (Manchester, 1995) p.168
[35] Joshi, ‘The "Human Rights Phase" of American Foreign Policy’, p.47
[36] Martha L. Cottam, ‘The Carter Administration's Policy Toward Nicaragua: Images,
Goals, and Tactics’, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Spring, 1992): p.123
[37] ‘Robert Pastor to Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron, 23rd October, 1978, Staff Office Files: National Security Adviser: Country Files, Box 45, Jimmy Carter Library in Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, p.187
[38] Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, p.183
[39] Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, p.185
[40] Cottam, ‘The Carter Administration's Policy Toward Nicaragua’, p.124
[41] Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency, p.168
[42] Richard R. Fagen, ‘The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?’, in Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978, Vol. 57, No. 3, (1978): p.661
[43] ‘Question and Answers Session with European Broadcast Journalists’, 2nd May, 1977 in Public Papers:1977, Book 1: p.766  
[44] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.144
[45] ‘State of the Union’ 19th January 1978, in Public Papers:1978, Book 1: p.95
[46] ‘State of the Union’ 25th January 1979, in Public Papers:1979, Book 1: p.161
[47] ‘State of the Union- Address Delivered Before Joint Session of Congress’, 23rd January, 1979, in Public Papers:1979, Book 1: p.108
[48] ‘New York Times’, January 1st, 1980, p.A1 in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations, (Massachussetts, 1990) p.95
[49] ‘Address Before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia’, May 9th, 1980, in Public Papers of the President of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1980/1981, Book 1, (Washington DC, 1981/82): p.868
[50] ‘Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Dinner of the Polish National Alliance, Niles, Illinois’, 20th September, 1980, in Public Papers:1980/1981, Book 2: p.1855
[51] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.145

[52] ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Final Act in Helsinki’, 29th July, 1980, in Public Papers:1980/1981, Book 2: p.1438