Here is the essay I just submitted for my course on the Image of America. So Jimmy, can government be competent?
IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JIMMY CARTER
In this essay the
realities of President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy and its human rights
agenda will be assessed against the backdrop of the rhetoric that surrounded it.
Upon assuming the office of President, Carter set out in no uncertain terms
that his approach to foreign policy would mark an immense sea change in the way
the United States conducted itself on the global scene. In his inaugural
address Carter explicitly linked the long established freedoms of American
society to how the United States should conduct itself in international affairs
stating that; “we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is
to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation” adding
that “[w]e will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards
here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to
our strength.”[1]
Here, Carter was explicitly linking the internal freedoms of American society
to its external behaviour, something that no President had sought to do since
the Cold War began. He believed that America had a special purpose and position
in spreading the message of human rights throughout the world noting that; “No
other country is as well qualified as we to set an example.”[2]
Similarly Carter sought to establish a link to his human rights policy to the
foundation of America stating that; “This policy [Human Rights Policy] has
produced some controversy, but it’s very much in keeping with the character and
the history of our own nation. We became an independent nation in a struggle
for human rights.”[3]
In asserting the new morality of
United States foreign policy Carter frequently referenced the damaging effect
that Vietnam, Watergate as well as the revelations of the Church Committee had on
public perceptions of government. In 1978 Carter remarked on this loss of
confidence saying that; “Another thing I learned when I was campaigning around
our Nation was that as a result of the Vietnam War, as a result of Watergate,
as a result of mistakes made and revealed in the CIA, that there had been a
loss of respect and a sense of partnership between the American people and our
government.”[4]
In order to combat this ‘loss of respect’ Carter sought to restore an image of
America of which Americans could again be proud, by setting “…American Foreign
Policy on a new course consistent with the values and highest ideals of the
American People.”[5]
Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski noted something similar
in his memoirs recalling the fact that; “After and almost unending series of
revelations about the abuse of governmental power at home and abroad, the
American people were dissatisfied with their government.”[6]
Carter was of the opinion that an ethical underpinning to American foreign affairs
could restore the American people’s image of America and themselves as honest,
decent and morally courageous. Furthermore, he felt it could re-establish
America’s role as an example to be followed and return it to its position as a
shining light to the rest of the world. On this point Carter remarked that “It
[Human Rights Policy] restores a kind of a beacon light of something that’s
clean and decent and proper as a rallying point for us in all the democracies
of the world.”[7]
Before examining how Carter’s policy was approached by his administration it is
first necessary to define in brief what his administration meant by human
rights.
It is
necessary to discuss in the context of this essay what the Carter
administration meant when discussing human rights, as it is a notion that is
prone to fluctuation owing to certain people’s rhetorical or partisan
positioning, or indeed their geographical or temporal positioning. Taking a
view from inside the Carter White House, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
helpfully and succinctly illuminates on what he means when discussing human
rights. Vance divides human rights into four levels, of which “[t]he most
important… are those that protect the security of the person.” He goes on to
state that; “[v]iolations of such rights include genocide; slavery; torture;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment; denial of fair trial; and invasion of the home.” Vance further
defines certain secondary rights as “that bundle of rights affecting the fulfilment
[sic] of such vital needs as food, clothing, shelter, health care, and
education.” The third set of right Vance defines are; “the right to enjoy civil
and political liberties. These include not only freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of religion, and freedom to assemble and to petition the
government to redress grievances” as well as “the freedom to move freely within
and to and from one's own country.” Lastly, Vance adds, “there is a basic human
right to freedom from discrimination because of race, religion, colour, [sic]
or gender.”[8]
. It is this standard of human rights as defined here by Vance that will be
applied in this essay. Taking Vance’s definitions of human rights to what
extent then did Carter achieve this renewed vision of a morally centred foreign
policy? It is to this question that we shall now turn, as well as assessing to
what extent Carter’s vision of expanding American ideals to the world was
successful in the context of the often volatile and changeable geopolitical
realities of the Cold War.
The first example we shall
examine here is Carter’s approach to the nations of Asia. We shall begin by
looking at the country Henry Kissinger had identified during the Ford
administration as “the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian
state”[9];
Indonesia. In his memoirs, Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, expresses satisfaction with the discernible fruits that were
yielded in Indonesia as a result of the new focus on human rights in American
foreign policy. Brzezinski states that; “In Southeast Asia the improvement in
human rights conditions was most notable in Indonesia” owing to the fact that “[o]ver
a period of eight months in 1977-78 the government released 15,000 political
prisoners and completed the release of the remaining 20,000 over the next two
years.”[10] In
spite of the successes that the United States had in Indonesia in relation to
the release of prisoners within the country, the approach taken to Indonesia’s
behaviour externally was drastically different.
Though Carter is frequently referred to as
the first post-Cold War president[11],
the considerations of his administration in relation to Indonesian actions towards
East Timor were heavily Cold War related[12]. On
the question of East Timor, which was described by Daniel Patrick Moynihan as
“a place of no great importance”[13],
Carter’s human rights approach to foreign policy was of secondary importance
owing to the considerations of Indonesia’s value as a Cold War ally. Mike
Armacost*
stressed this importance to Brzezinski in a memorandum for Carter, noting that;
“Our stake in close ties with Indonesia derives from its large size and
population, strategic location, potential for leadership within Southeast
Asia…and its abundant energy and other natural resources.”[14]
As a direct result of Indonesia’s perceived importance within the Carter White
House the human rights agenda in foreign policy was not only side-lined but on
the issue of East Timor was actively subverted. Armacost recommended to
Brzezinski that the United States Government should; “[e]ase up on the human
rights pressures directed at Indonesia” as well as stating that “we should seek
to persuade Congressman FraserÑ
to cease hearings on the Timor question.”[15] Similarly
documents that Congressman Fraser requested regarding Gerald Ford and Henry
Kissinger’s advanced knowledge of Indonesia’s plans for east Timor were
withheld by Brzezinski on the grounds that; “It would create a very damaging
precedent in terms of preserving the confidentiality surrounding Presidential
meetings with foreign leaders that is essential to any orderly process of
foreign policy-making.”[16]
The Carter administration, as well as seeking to subvert any public
knowledge of the gross human rights violations that took place in East Timor at
the hands of the Indonesian military, provided crucial material aid to the
process of the annexation. Carter in fact stepped up arms transfers to the
Indonesian military in 1977 and 1978, when arguably atrocities against the
Timorese were at their worst. The Carter White House approved the biggest arms
transfers and sales to Indonesia in 1978 totalling 127 million dollars, the
second largest arms transfer approved between 1975 and 1995.[17] It
is apparent then, that Carter’s human rights policy failed in East Timor. While
his administration sought to make human rights the cornerstone of foreign
policy, in relation to the Timorese this policy was side-lined for the concerns
of an ally that was too important to sacrifice during the Cold War. This
episode displays that there were times when the strategic concerns of the
United States were too important to ignore at the expense of moral consistency,
and the image of ethical American foreign policy Carter referred to in public
did not match the background realities of Cold War diplomatic discussion.
Another instance where these issues again became prominent in the crucial
strategic region of Southeast Asia was in Cambodia. It is to that example that
we shall now turn.
It was in large part during the Carter
administration that one of the most infamous genocides of the modern age took
place in Cambodia. It appeared at first as if the United States was preparing
to take a more aggressive stand against Cambodia than it had with regard to
Indonesia and East Timor, speaking out in strong terms against the abuses that
were taking place there. In April 1978 Carter pronounced that; “America cannot
avoid the responsibility to speak out in condemnation of the Cambodian
Government, the worst violator of human rights in the world today” going on to
conclude that “[i]t is an obligation of every member of the international
community to protest the policies of this or any nation which cruelly and
systematically violates the rights of its people to enjoy life and basic human
dignities.”[18]
Carter, however, would face similar difficulties with Cambodia as it did with
Indonesia and East Timor i.e. the potential to alienate a prospective and
powerful strategic ally. This time that prospective ally was the People’s
Republic of China. This emerged as the reality, owing itself to the fact that
the Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge was supported by the Chinese Government, with
whom Carter wanted to develop a new relationship.[19] The
concern for human rights in Cambodia would have to be tempered if there was to
be, as was desired, a new and normalised relationship with the Chinese
government.
It was for this reason that the Carter
administration was severely critical of the incursions by Vietnamese troops
into Cambodia in late 1978, which sought to oust the Pol Pot regime, but
somewhat less vocal on Chinese incursion into Vietnam, conducted with the view of
maintaining the same regime. Though Carter was at this time seeking to
normalise relations with both Vietnam and China the relationship with China
took primacy.[20]
What this meant for Carter’s policy towards Cambodia was that they provided
food aid to the Cambodian government as well as voting alongside China in the
United Nations to seat the Khmer Rouge. The humanitarian aid the Khmer Rouge
received was certainly invaluable to their survival and their ability to
protract the genocidal policies of their hideous regime.[21] The
Carter White House was again forced to distance itself from consistency on its
human rights stance giving into the reality that China was a more valuable
partner than Vietnam. Carter’s policy towards Cambodia, as it had been in
relation to Indonesia, centred more on geopolitical concerns than it did on
human rights.[22]
Though it was recognised that the Khmer Rouge was ‘the worst violator of human
rights in the world’ the normalisation of relations with China took primacy
over assertive action in opposition to them. This resulted in them giving tacit
approval to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam,[23]
and in calling for a withdrawal from both sides reaffirmed that there was “no
bilateral disharmony between ourselves and the Chinese”[24].
Although Carter sought to halt the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia and
bolster the Khmer Rouge, with the view of strengthening ties with China, it is
apparent that without Vietnamese intervention the Pol Pot regime might have
continued its maniacal tyranny in Cambodia. Speaking on this possibility,
albeit in retrospect, Norodom Sihanouk opined that; “If they [Vietnam] had not
ousted Pol Pot, everyone would have died –not only me, but everyone- they would
have killed us all.”[25] In
the case of Cambodia Carter’s human rights concerns had to be set aside in
favour of strengthening strategic and geopolitical concerns. Moving away from
events in Asia, we will next examine how Carter’s foreign policy aims were
carried out in the Middle East, looking specifically at Iran.
In his memoirs Zbigniew
Brzezinski states that “Iran was the Carter administration’s greatest setback.”[26]
At the beginning of Carter’s presidency the Shah of Iran was greatly concerned
that his rule would be publically targeted by Carter as a specific case where
there was a need for improvement on human rights. This prompted Carter in 1977
to write to the Shah in order to give him the reassurance he sought. Carter
wrote to the Shah noting the “particularly close ties which have existed
between our two countries since World War II are supported by a broad consensus
in the United States that we share many vital mutual objectives and that it is
in the interest of our country to cooperate with yours.”[27] As
well as this in early 1978 Carter visited Iran in order to reaffirm support for
the cornerstone of American security interests in the region.[28]
On his trip Carter lauded the Shah stating that; “Iran, because of the great
leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled
areas of the world. This is a great tribute to Your Majesty, and to your
leadership and to the respect and admiration and love which your people give
you.”[29]
While en route back to Washington Carter was asked whether he brought up the
issue of human rights in Iran and remarked; “the Shah is very deeply concerned
about human rights, and I mentioned human rights in my statement in Iran.”[30]
However, events would gradually deteriorate in Iran, and as the demise of the
Shah’s regime gathered pace Carter would be confronted with increasingly
difficult choices as to what extent he should offer the support of the United
States.
Zbigniew Brzezinski writes extensively on the
White House’s responses to the worsening crisis in Iran throughout 1978/79. He
highlights the tensions in how the Shah was presented to the public, the
realities of inconsistency with human rights policies, and the reasons why the
maintenance of his frequently egregious regime was strategically crucial. On
these points Brzezinski tells us that; “we knew that our ties with Iran would
suffer if our principal regional ally was seen by the American public as
flagrantly violating human rights.”[31] It
was strategic, economic and security
concerns, and a disregard for human rights as a consequence, that caused the
Carter White House to seek to maintain friendly relations with the Shah. Indeed
the intimations of Carter that arms sales would be restricted by those
countries that proved to be consistent violators of human rights did not apply
in Iran. The trade continued, in spite of the knowledge of increasing human
rights abuses as opposition to the Shah’s rule intensified, in the fashion of
‘business as usual’.[32]
Commenting on the reasons for this Brzezinski states that; “Recognising [sic]
Iran’s strategic centrality, we chose to continue that policy, [Nixon/Kissinger
Arms Transfers] approving major sales of arms to Iran in the course of 1978.”[33] In
the end all of this was not enough to save the Shah’s regime. Carter’s Iranian
policy after his fall centred entirely on the hostage situation that emerged
after supporters of the new Khomeini regime occupied the American Embassy in
Tehran in response to American support for their hated former dictator.[34]
In the case of Iran the Carter administration was again forced to ‘fly in the
face’ of its human rights concerns in order to try and secure crucial economic
and strategic concerns. We will now examine the extent to which Carter was able
to apply a human rights agenda to another nation of the world that underwent
significant political change during his years in the White House; Nicaragua.
The approach of the Carter
administration to Nicaragua provides some of the more glaring inconsistencies
in the application of his foreign policy. Nicaragua had long been subjected to
the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, though his position had
been maintained as he was considered a crucial component of American interests
in Latin America.[35]
However, Somoza, like the Shah, would come under ever intensifying pressures to
relinquish his rule during the years Jimmy Carter was in office, and as
aforementioned the Carter administration responded with remarkable
inconsistency in the application of policy towards Nicaragua. Example of these
inconsistencies include the termination of aid in 1977 followed by 12 million
dollars in military aid the following year and criticism of Somoza in 1977 in
the area of human rights followed by praise the following year.[36]
The administration’s concerns for Nicaragua were largely born out of a
pervading trend developing in Latin America and the Caribbean at the time. Robert
Pastor (National Security Adviser on Latin America and the Caribbean) expressed
concern to David Aaron (Deputy National Security Adviser) and Brzezinski
regarding this trend and its possible implications for the future of Nicaragua
noting that El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala all had “a strong intransigent
military government with little or no popular support” that were all equally
opposed by “revolutionary guerrilla groups which are predominantly indigenous
but maintain ties with Cuba and each other.”[37]
It was owing to these concerns that as fighting intensified with Somoza’s
National Guard and the Sandinista insurgency in 1978 Carter sent additional aid
to Somoza.[38]
As the situation looked
increasingly bleak for the survival of Somoza’s regime Carter somewhat naively
sought to find a solution that maintained Somoza’s institutions, including his
hated National Guard, but extricated Somoza himself.[39]
The fundamental conflict at play with Nicaragua was between those among
Carter’s staff who believed human rights should be preserved above all against
those who took the view that was relevant to the developing Cold War realities.[40]
It is apparent that, given Carter’s continued support for Somoza, the latter
won a majority of the arguments that may have taken place on the issue. In June
of 1978 Carter sent a letter of support to Somoza, in which he welcomed the
dictator’s promises to restore human rights to Nicaragua. The letter was
condemned from all sides and despite a subsequent scramble to downplay the
letter being a show of support, significant damage had been done to perceptions
of Carter’s approach to Nicaragua,[41]as
the letter was naturally interpreted as a show of support for the dictator.[42]
On the issue of Nicaragua the Carter administration again showed significant
shortcomings in its efforts to apply with sufficient rigour or consistency a
human rights agenda in its foreign policy. While seeking to maintain a regime
without Somoza, but one that retained the dictatorial infrastructure, such as
the National Guard, Carter’s dedication to his human rights agenda encountered
significant scepticism from many quarters. Having examined some of the
shortcomings in Carter’s human rights agenda in relation to Indonesia,
Cambodia, Iran and Nicaragua we will now conclude by examining how these
approaches to foreign policy concerns stacked up against his assertions at the
beginning of his Presidency that he would actively pursue a correlation between
America’s internal freedoms and its behaviour externally.
Although this essay has
accentuated the negatives of Carter’s approaches to various situations that
arose during his presidency, this was carried out with a view to examining the
shortcomings of his foreign policy, and the inconsistencies that existed in an
approach that had human rights as its stated foundation. On a positive note
Carter significantly advanced the cause of human rights globally by his
championing of new standards in the form of the Helsinki Accords, as well as
making human rights part of the regular parlance of international diplomacy. As
Carter stated in relation to this; “I think there are very few leaders in the
world now who don’t realise that their attitude toward the basic question of
human rights is a crucial element on our future relationships with them.”[43]
In relation to the shortcomings in the application of these policies, some of
which have been discussed here, Brzezinksi states that; “our principles were
not always applied with an adequate sense of nuance and specificity. This was
due partly problems inherent in fitting human rights criteria into the framework
of American interests, but also partly to our own shortcomings.”[44]
At the outset of his
administration Carter heavily linked his hopes that America’s ideals and
internal freedoms would be reflected in its behaviour in the world. He
frequently reaffirmed this position in public, stating in his 1978 State of the
Union speech that “[t]he very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm
commitment to human rights.”[45]
As well as linking foreign policy to the values of the nation Carter also appealed to the sensibilities of the American people
stating that; “The effort to make human rights a central component of our
foreign policy comes from our deepest sense of ourselves as a humane and
freedom-loving people.”[46]
In seeking to connect his foreign policy to the nation Carter referenced the
foundation of the American nation saying that; “as long as I am President, at
home and around the world America’s examples and America’s influence will be
marshalled [sic] to advance the cause of human rights. To establish those
values, two centuries ago a bold generation of Americans risked their property,
their position, and life itself.”[47]
The timing of Carter’s administration made it rhetorically advantageous to make
such connections; the American nation having just celebrated its bicentennial.
However, Carter was confronted with various crises during his time in the White
House, most notably the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan. Commenting on the latter Carter acknowledged that his “opinion of
the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the
previous two-and-a half years.”[48]
As the crises deepened in Iran
and Afghanistan Carter tempered his pronouncements with a more realistic slant.
Speaking on the crises that had emerged in 1979 Carter stated that; “These two
crises [Afghanistan and Iran] underline the reality that our world is indeed a
dangerous place, but what I want to emphasise today is that amid the crises of
the moment…the fundamentals of American Foreign Policy are being carried
forward with consistency, with strength and with determination” adding that “we
must strive in our own foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a
sober calculation of our own national interests.”[49]
Carter, however still maintained that; “America is Human Rights. That’s what
America was meant to be.”[50]
Brzezinski on this issue states that; “In the first two years of the
Administration these global concerns tended to overshadow the pressing
requirements of strategic reality. In the last two, we had to make up for lost
time, giving a higher priority to the more fundamental interests of National
Security.”[51]
When viewed in the context of the obvious inconsistencies that emerged in his
efforts to enact this foreign policy Carter’s pronouncements on the linkage
between America, its traditions, freedoms and people with the human rights
foundation of his foreign policy caused a fundamental question to emerge.
Namely whether these values, which are considered so central to American’s
image of their nation as well as the image American leadership wishes to
present around the world, are consistent with foreign policy? Based on the
lessons of the Carter administration it would appear that there can be little
if any correlation between the internal freedoms of American society and its
external behaviour, in spite of what pronouncements may come from leadership
within America. While rhetorically Carter maintained there was consistency in
his policy, the examples cited above as well as many others that there is no
room to discuss here appear to indicate otherwise. The expansion of what are
the most treasured elements of the image of America to its behaviour in
international politics may be unattainable owing to the existence of more
pressing strategic realities. While there can be no degree of certainty as to
what extent this is true since the fall of the Soviet Union, in the context of
the Cold War this was certainly the reality, as can be attested to by the
people of East Timor, Iran, Indonesia, Nicaragua and many other nations. For
these reasons it seems prudent to reject Jimmy Carter’s promotion of the idea
he espoused when quoting the American writer and poet Archibald McLeish; “There
are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and
mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It’s the American Dream.”[52]
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
-Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security
Adviser, 1977-1981, (London, 1983)
- Clymer,
Kenton, The United States and Cambodia,
1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship, (London, 2004)
- Cottam, Martha L., ‘The Carter
Administration's Policy Toward Nicaragua: Images, Goals, and Tactics’, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107,
No. 1 (Spring, 1992): pp.123-146
- Dumbrell,
John, The Carter Presidency: A
Re-Evaluation, (Manchester, 1995)
- Fagen,
Richard R., ‘The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?’,
in Foreign Affairs: America and the World
1978, Vol. 57, No. 3, (1978): pp.652-669
- Hurst,
Steven, The Carter Administration and
Vietnam, (London, 1996)
- Joshi,
Manoj K., ‘The "Human Rights Phase" of American Foreign Policy’, in Social Scientist, Vol. 10, No. 6 (June,
1982): pp.38-50
- Kivimӓki,
Timo Antero, ‘National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US Exercise of
Power in Indonesia, 1974-1979’, in Human
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1994): pp.415-431
- Moynihan, Daniel
Patrick, A Dangerous Place, (London,
1979)
- Moynihan,
Daniel Patrick, On the Law of Nations,
(Massachussetts, 1990)
- Muravchik,
Joshua, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy
Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy, (Maryland, 1986)
-Papers
of the Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1977,
Books 1 and 2, (Washington DC, 1977/1978) - United States Government Printing
Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the
United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1978, Books 1 and 2,
(Washington DC, 1979) - United States Government Printing Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the
United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1979, Books 1 and 2,
(Washington DC, 1980) - United States Government Printing Office
- Papers of the Presidents of the
United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1980/1981,
Books 1,2 and 3, (Washington DC, 1981/1982) - United States Government Printing
Office
- Rosati,
Jerel A., ‘Jimmy Carter, A Man before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of
the First Post-Cold War Presidency ‘, in Presidential
Studies Quarterly: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Presidencies, Vol. 23,
No.3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 459-476
- Schmitz,
David F., The United States and Right
Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989, (New York, 2006)
- Schmitz,
David F. and Walker, Vanessa, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human
Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, in Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, Issue 1 (January,
2004): pp.113-143
-Vance, Cyrus, ‘The
Human Rights Imperative’, in Foreign
Policy, No. 63 (Summer, 1986): pp.3-19
INTERNET RESOURCES
[1] Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter,
20th January 1977 – Available at the US Presidency Project http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6575#axzz1sOZdmUw0
(Accessed 15-4-2012)
[2]
‘Address at the Commencement of Exercises at the University of Notre Dame’ 22nd
May 1977, in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1977, Book 1, (Washington DC, 1977/8): p.958
[3]
‘The President’s News Conference’ 15th December, 1977, in Public Papers:1977, Book 2: p.2115
[4]
‘Remarks at the Hibernian Society Dinner; Savannah, Georgia’ 17th
March 1978, in Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States of America: Jimmy Carter: 1978, Book 1, (Washington DC, 1979): p.542
[5]
‘State of the Union’ 19th January 1978, in Public Papers:1978, Book 1: p.117
[6]
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle:
Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, (London, 1983) p.124
[7]
‘Remarks and a Question and Answers Session with a Group of Publishers, Editors
and Broadcasters’ May 20th 1977, in Public Papers:1977, Book 1: p.947
[8]
Cyrus Vance, ‘The Human Rights Imperative’,
in Foreign Policy, No. 63
(Summer, 1986): p.4
[9]
Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, “East Timor Revisited” 21st
November, 1975, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.62,
Document 3 in David F. Schmitz, The
United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989, (New York, 2006)
p.136
[10]
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.128
[11]
For examples of this see Jerel A. Rosati, ‘Jimmy Carter, A Man before His Time?
The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post-Cold War Presidency ‘, in Presidential Studies Quarterly: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Presidencies,
Vol. 23, No.3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 459-476, and Vanessa Walker and David F.
Schmitz, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development
of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, in Diplomatic
History, Vol. 28, Issue 1 (January, 2004): p.113-143.
[12]
Timo Antero Kivimӓki, ‘National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US
Exercise of Power in Indonesia, 1974-
1979’, in Human
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1994): p.428
[13]
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous
Place, (London, 1979) p.246
* Armacost was selected
as a member of the National Security Council to handle East Asian and Chinese
affairs under the Carter administration.
[14] Memo
for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Michael Armacost, "Initiatives to Deepen Relations
with Indonesia”, June 14, 1977 – National Security Archive Staff Materials, Far
East Files, Box 4, Jimmy Carter Library –Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/1034.pdf
(Accessed 15-4-2012)
Ñ Donald Fraser;
Democratic Congressman for Minnesota held a number of hearings in human rights
abuses in East Timor during the late 1970s’
[15]
Memo for Brzezinksi from Armacost, “Initiatives
to Deepen Relations with Indonesia”, June 14, 1977
[16] Memo
from Michael Armacost to David Aaron and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Request
from Don Fraser for MemCon on President Ford Meeting with President
Suharto," July 6, 1977 - Freedom of Information Act Release to the
National Security Archive – Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/878.pdf
(Accessed 15-4-2012)
[17]
William D. Hartung, ‘U.S. Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997: Who's
Influencing Whom?’, in World Policy
Journal, (March, 1997) – Available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indoarms.html#financing
(Accessed 16-4-2012)
[18]
‘Statement by the President on Human Rights Violations in Cambodia’, 21st
April, 1978, in Public Papers:1978,
Book 1: p.768
[19]
Kenton Clymer, The United States and
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[32] Joshi,
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[38]
Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing
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[39] Schmitz,
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[40] Cottam,
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[41] Dumbrell,
The Carter Presidency, p.168
[42]
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